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Abstract 
 This research examined the underlying mechanisms in the accumulation of perceptual 
bias effects within the context of a criminal investigation. Biased assimilation processes, 
including the tendency to seek, interpret, and remember information in a manner consistent 
with one’s expectation, and perceived consensus were proposed as potential mediators of 
accumulation. Two experiments tested this proposition by manipulating perceivers’ 
expectations about a fabricated target’s guilt and their interaction with another person. 
Results from Experiment 1 indicated that perceptual bias effects accumulated across those 
perceivers who reported having similar beliefs with another person’s written statement. 
These perceivers reported more extreme beliefs about the suspect’s guilt in a direction 
consistent with their initial expectation than those who either did not perceive consensus with 
another person’s written statement or who were not exposed to information from another 
person. There was no evidence to indicate biased seeking tendencies mediated this effect; 
however, there was support for biased interpretation and some support for biased recall 
tendencies as mediators of accumulation. In contrast to Experiment 1, the results from 
Experiment 2 indicated that perceptual bias effects were not accumulating across perceivers. 
Perceivers who worked in pairs did not report more extreme beliefs about the suspect’s guilt 
than those who worked alone. Although perceivers’ sought, interpreted, and remembered 
information in a manner consistent with their expectations, they did not do so to a greater 
extent when working with someone who shared their beliefs about the suspect’s guilt than 
when working alone. In addition, the majority of perceivers perceived consensus even in 
situations in which they worked with someone who was given a dissimilar expectation about 
the suspect’s guilt. The inconsistent findings across the two experiments are discussed in 
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regards to differences in methodology. The findings are also discussed in regards to their 
implications for understanding how and when expectations can shape social reality and for 
understanding factors that may contribute to errors within the criminal justice system.
1 
 
 
Introduction 
People are immersed in a complex social world that requires them to develop 
strategies for understanding and anticipating how people behave. Individuals gather 
information from a variety of sources and use this information to generate expectations about 
how others will think, act, and feel. Generally speaking, these expectations are beneficial 
because they allow people to formulate appropriate courses of action for interacting with 
others. However, people’s expectations are sometimes inaccurate. Inaccurate expectations 
have the potential to bias people’s subsequent impressions by virtue of their tendency to be 
confirmed through perceptual processes such as a perceptual bias. A perceptual bias occurs 
when an individual’s inaccurate expectation about another person biases his or her 
subsequent impressions of that person in a manner consistent with the inaccurate expectation. 
That is, a perceptual bias occurs when an individual believes that his or her expectation has 
been confirmed to a greater extent than it has in reality (Darley & Fazio, 1980; Jussim, 1991; 
Neuberg, 1989; Snyder & Haugen, 1995). 
 Research has provided support for the existence of perceptual bias effects (see 
Jussim, Eccles, & Madon, 1996; Rosenthal & Rubin, 1978; Snyder & Stukas, 1999, for 
reviews). However, the magnitude of these effects tends to be modest (see Jussim, 1991; 
Jussim et al., 1996; Rosenthal & Rubin, 1978, for reviews). Nevertheless, this does not mean 
that the effects of perceptual biases are always modest. There are conditions under which 
these effects have the potential to be powerful (Jussim, 1986). For example, even small 
perceptual bias effects can become powerful if they accumulate across people. That is, two 
people holding similar and inaccurate expectations for another person may come to believe 
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that their expectations have been confirmed to a greater extent than they would have 
otherwise believed had they been alone or with someone holding a dissimilar expectation. 
 There is some preliminary support for the accumulation of perceptual bias effects 
(Willard, Madon, Guyll, Buller, & Scherr, 2008). In one experiment, researchers manipulated 
participants’ expectations of other participants. Some participants were led to believe they 
would be interacting with a hostile individual, whereas other participants were not given any 
specific expectation about the individual. The similarity of participants’ expectations was 
also manipulated so that either both participants had no expectation about their interaction 
partner (i.e., non-hostile expectation), one participant had a hostile expectation whereas the 
other had no expectation (i.e., single-hostile expectation), or both participants had a hostile 
expectation (i.e., double-hostile expectation). Consistent with an accumulation process, 
participants in the double-hostile expectation condition rated the target individual as more 
hostile than participants in the single-hostile and non-hostile expectation conditions. 
Although this study provided support for the accumulation of perceptual bias effects, it was 
not intended to identify the underlying mechanisms responsible for those effects. Thus, 
conducting further research is necessary to elucidate the mechanisms that lead to the 
accumulation of perceptual bias effects.   
The primary scientific objective of this dissertation was to advance current 
knowledge regarding how perceptual bias effects accumulate across people. With this 
objective in mind, this dissertation sought to make following contributions to the literature. 
First, it attempted to replicate previous experimental work on the accumulation of perceptual 
bias effects. Second, it examined the possibility that biased assimilation and consensus 
processes served as underlying mechanisms leading to cumulative perceptual bias effects. 
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Third, it examined these issues within the context of the legal system in order to apply the 
accumulation process to a socially meaningful area.  
This proposal is organized into nine chapters. The first chapter reviews relevant 
literature on perceptual biases. The second chapter discusses the overall power of perceptual 
bias effects and describes how these effects might become larger through the process of 
accumulation. The third chapter outlines potential underlying mechanisms that may 
contribute to the accumulation process. The fourth chapter presents a theoretical model 
showing the proposed relations between perceivers’ expectations and their impressions of 
targets. The fifth chapter provides an overview of the methods and hypotheses for two 
experimental investigations of the accumulation process. The sixth and seventh chapters 
provide a description of the proposed methods and analyses for two preliminary studies. The 
eighth and ninth chapters include the methods, results, and discussion of two experiments 
designed to examine accumulation and the processes that may contribute to this effect. The 
final chapter discusses the results, implications, and limitations of this work and avenues for 
future research. 
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Chapter 1: The Perceptual Bias 
The social psychological literature has long emphasized the power of individuals to 
construct social reality (Klein & Snyder, 2003; Miller & Turnbull, 1986; Snyder & Stukas, 
1999). This emphasis dates back to New Look in Perception research (e.g., Bruner, 1957; 
Merton, 1948) which proposed that people interpret reality through perceptual lenses that are 
biased by people’s expectations. These expectations can be beneficial because they help 
people prepare for new situations and provide a framework through which to make sense of 
incoming information. People will use their expectations in this manner even though their 
expectations may not be completely accurate. Sometimes people’s expectations about others 
are inaccurate because they fail to take into consideration situational factors, because they are 
based on irrelevant personal experiences, or because they are derived from invalid 
information such as rumor, hearsay, or social stereotypes (Olson, Roese, & Zanna, 1996; 
Snyder & Stukas, 1999). Regardless of the source, inaccurate expectations have the potential 
to channel social interactions in such a way as to lead people to believe that their 
expectations have been confirmed. 
A perceptual bias occurs when people believe that their expectations about others 
have been confirmed to a greater extent than they have in reality (Darley & Fazio, 1980; 
Jussim, 1991; Neuberg, 1989; Snyder & Haugen, 1995). Unlike a self-fulfilling prophecy in 
which confirmation exists because people change their behavior in a manner consistent with 
another’s expectation (Merton, 1948), in a perceptual bias the confirmation simply exists in 
the mind of the individual holding the expectation. However, these processes are not 
mutually exclusive. They may occur simultaneously if the target of an expectation has 
changed his or her behavior to be consistent with another’s expectation and yet, that person 
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still overestimates the degree of confirmation that occurred. Additionally, a perceptual bias is 
distinct from belief perseverance. Belief perseverance occurs when people continue to hold 
their beliefs in the face of contradicting information (Anderson, in press; Ross, Lepper, & 
Hubbard, 1975). Although belief perseverance may be one outcome of a perceptual bias, a 
perceptual bias reflects a process involving interrelations between people.  
The perceptual bias process includes three steps. First, an individual (the perceiver) 
develops an inaccurate expectation about another individual (the target). For example, a 
teacher (the perceiver) may develop the expectation that a particular student (the target) is 
exceptionally bright when the student may in fact be performing only at an average level. 
Second, the perceiver treats the target as if the inaccurate expectation is true. The teacher 
may do this by smiling more at the student relative to other students in the class, spending 
more time with the student than he or she spends with other students, asking the student more 
challenging questions than he or she asks other students, or teaching the student more 
difficult material than he or she teaches other students in the class (Rosenthal, 1973). Third, 
the perceiver believes that target has confirmed the expectation to a greater extent than the 
target has in reality. For example, a teacher’s inaccurate expectation about a student’s 
intelligence may bias the teacher’s evaluation of the student’s classroom performance but not 
influence the student’s actual level of achievement as measured by a standardized test. In this 
case, there is not sufficient evidence proving that the student has improved his or her 
performance, but the teacher believes the student has confirmed the earlier expectation. 
Literature Relevant to Perceptual Biases  
A perceptual bias has the potential to exist in any situation where a perceiver holds an 
inaccurate expectation about a target. If perceivers believe that a target has confirmed their 
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expectations to a greater extent than is warranted, then a perceptual bias has occurred. 
Research related to this phenomenon can be found in several different literatures including, 
but not limited to, general research on person perception, research on self-fulfilling 
prophecies, attribution research, and research involving stigmas and stereotyping. This 
research has provided ample support for the existence of perceptual bias effects (see 
Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Hamilton, Sherman, & Ruvolo, 1990; Jussim et al., 1996; Miller 
& Turnbull, 1986; Rosenthal & Rubin, 1978; Snyder & Stukas, 1999, for reviews). For 
example, teachers’ inaccurate expectations about students’ performance bias their subsequent 
evaluations of students’ classroom achievement (Jussim, et al., 1996; Rosenthal & Jacobsen, 
1968), mothers’ gender-stereotypic beliefs predict their evaluations of their children’s 
abilities (Jacobs & Eccles, 1992), and participants given false information about a child’s 
socioeconomic status differentially rate the academic ability of that child based on the same 
observations (Darley & Gross, 1983). Perceptual bias effects have even been found in 
situations in which targets have displayed disconfirming behavior. For example, Ickes, 
Patterson, Rajecki, and Tanford (1982) observed that perceivers who expected targets to be 
unfriendly rated them consistent with their expectations despite the fact that these targets 
actually behaved in a friendly manner.  
Importance of Perceptual Biases 
The idea that people can leave an interaction believing that their expectations have 
been confirmed, despite a lack of confirming evidence, is fascinating in its own right. 
However, the consequences of a perceptual bias are particularly meaningful to those who are 
the target of negative expectations. Researchers have long speculated that expectancy effects 
contribute to social problems. For example, Merton (1948) proposed that people believe that 
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their expectations about members of racial and ethnic out-groups have been confirmed 
regardless of the behavior displayed by group members. Because these expectations are 
typically based on negative stereotypes, they have the potential to perpetuate prejudicial 
attitudes and discriminatory practices.  
Of course, one need not be a member of a stereotyped group to experience the 
unpleasant effects of a perceptual bias. People’s inaccurate and negative expectations may 
start a chain of events that have the potential to undermine the opportunities and 
competencies of individuals who are the targets of such expectancies. These expectations 
may color people’s later impressions which have the potential to negatively impact targets in 
a variety of settings. For example, teachers’ negative evaluations may contribute to the 
tracking of students into low-ability programs, interviewers’ negative impressions may result 
in a decision not to hire an applicant, or people’s mislabeling of individuals may influence 
other’s opinions. Within the legal system, researchers have noted the ripple effect that 
“tunnel vision” can have on the impressions of detectives, attorneys, judges, and juries 
(Findley & Scott, 2006). Inaccurate expectations developed early in an investigation have the 
potential to bias evaluations of a suspect’s guilt at later points, which can lead to an 
erroneous arrest and the prosecution of innocent persons (Kassin, 2006). Thus, the belief that 
one’s inaccurate expectation has been confirmed can have serious negative consequences in a 
number of real-world settings.  
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Chapter 2: The Accumulation of Perceptual Bias Effects 
Even though research supports the existence of perceptual bias effects, the magnitude 
of these effects is generally modest. For example, the degree to which teachers’ inaccurate 
expectations bias their subsequent judgments of students’ academic ability is usually in the 
neighborhood of .2 in terms of standardized regression coefficients (see Jussim et al., 1996 
for review). Likewise, the average effect size of stereotyped-based expectations on 
impressions of targets with identical personality characteristics equals .25 in terms of a 
correlation coefficient (see Kunda & Thagard, 1996 for a meta-analysis).  
However, these small effects represent averages that do not take into consideration 
the possibility that certain psychological processes could render perceptual bias effects 
relatively powerful. For example, even small perceptual bias effects could become powerful 
if they accumulate across perceivers. That is, perceivers may come to believe that their 
expectations about a target have been confirmed to a greater extent than they actually have 
when other perceivers appear to hold similar expectations about the same target. If perceptual 
bias effects are bolstered by simply engaging with other individuals who hold similar 
expectations, then this process could be particularly meaningful for targets in any setting 
where there are multiple inaccurate expectations held about them. Such targets may be 
judged inappropriately and given fewer opportunities precisely because perceivers believe 
that their expectations have been fulfilled to a greater extent than they have in reality. 
There exists only one study examining the accumulation of perceptual bias effects 
(Willard et al., 2008). In this study, trios of same-sex participants, each consisting of two 
perceivers and one target, were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: non-hostile 
expectation, single-hostile expectation, or double-hostile expectation condition. In the non-
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hostile expectation condition, neither perceiver received information about the target's 
hostility. In the single-hostile expectation condition, one perceiver received bogus 
information that the target was hostile, whereas the other perceiver did not. In the double-
hostile expectation condition, both perceivers received bogus information that the target was 
hostile. Thus, this design manipulated both perceivers’ expectations about the target’s 
hostility (i.e., non-hostile expectation versus hostile expectation) and the similarity of their 
expectations (i.e., similar versus dissimilar). Participants took part in an interaction in which 
the two perceivers alternated asking the target questions. Perceivers independently selected 
their questions from a pool of questions that were designed to elicit either a non-hostile or a 
hostile response. After the interaction, perceivers’ impressions of the target’s hostility were 
assessed and later experimenters blind to condition independently coded targets’ behaviors. 
Results indicated that targets’ hostility did not differ across conditions. However, consistent 
with the process of accumulation, results showed perceivers' impressions of the target’s 
hostility became greater as the number of perceivers induced with a hostile expectation 
increased from zero to one to two. Accordingly, perceivers believed that their expectations 
had been fulfilled to a greater extent when interacting with someone who shared their 
expectations rather than with one who did not.  
Implications of Cumulative Perceptual Bias Effects 
The idea that perceptual bias effects accumulate when people share similar 
expectations about the same individual is important for several reasons. First, it suggests that 
the literature may be underestimating the magnitude of perceptual bias effects because 
researchers have tended to focus on situations involving only one perceiver. Although there 
are many instances in which such a focus is clearly warranted, there also exist a myriad of 
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situations involving multiple perceivers each of whom could potentially hold similar 
expectations about the same target. For example, different teachers in an elementary school 
may hold similar expectations about the same student, multiple supervisors in an office may 
hold similar expectations about a particular job applicant, and many perceivers may hold 
similar stereotypic beliefs about members of stereotyped and stigmatized groups. These 
situations are fundamentally different from situations involving only one perceiver, and raise 
the possibility that the magnitude of perceptual bias effects observed in the literature may 
underestimate the true extent to which perceivers believe their expectations have been 
confirmed in a variety of real world situations in which perceivers interact with other 
perceivers who share their beliefs. Accordingly, perceivers’ inaccurate expectations have the 
potential to strongly bias their subsequent impressions of targets through a process of 
accumulation and, by so doing, produce the kinds of social problems that Merton (1948) 
discussed. 
Second, the accumulation of perceptual bias effects may increase the chances that 
targets of negative expectations will be placed on a harmful course. For example, if several 
teachers believe that their negative expectations about a student have been confirmed, then 
that student’s chances of being tracked into a low ability group may be much higher than if 
only one teacher had originally held that expectation. Similarly, if multiple interviewers leave 
an interview with the impression that a job applicant has fulfilled their negative expectations, 
then they may be less likely to hire that applicant than if only one interviewer had held that 
negative expectation. Because targets need not display expectancy consistent behavior for 
perceivers to believe their expectations have been confirmed, it is possible that targets may 
be completely unaware that perceivers see them differently than they see themselves. 
11 
 
 
Without this awareness, they may not work to change perceivers’ inaccurate impressions 
(Hilton & Darley, 1985; Stukas & Snyder, 2001) – a situation that may ultimately lead 
perceivers to assume that their expectations were accurate all along.  
The outcome of such a process is that perceivers may feel justified holding onto their 
inaccurate expectations and continue to behave consistently with them. For example, 
perceivers who believe that their negative expectations have been confirmed in one social 
interaction may avoid future interactions with that target (Harris, 1993). They may even 
generalize that avoidant behavior to other targets who belong to the same social group as the 
first target. Indeed, people often avoid interactions with stigmatized group members (Snyder, 
Kleck, Strenta, & Mentzer, 1979). Thus, the accumulation of perceptual bias effects may put 
targets on negative trajectories that restrict their opportunities for skill development and 
advancement. 
Although there is preliminary empirical support for the accumulation of perceptual 
bias effects across people (Willard et al., 2008), it is necessary to replicate this finding. 
Further research is needed to determine whether a similar pattern of results appears in other 
contexts using different expectations and to identify the underlying psychological processes 
that contribute to the accumulation of perceptual bias effects. 
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Chapter 3: Underlying Mechanisms 
One of the objectives of the proposed research was to identify processes that may 
contribute to the accumulation of perceptual bias effects. This chapter first reviews the 
literature on known causes of perceptual biases and then discusses underlying processes that 
may be capable of producing cumulative perceptual bias effects.   
Processes Contributing to Perceptual Bias Effects  
Researchers and theorists have long observed the propensity for people to engage in 
biased assimilation processes in order to maintain their initial beliefs (e.g., Lord, Ross, & 
Lepper, 1979; Olson et al., 1996; Nickerson, 1998; Trope & Liberman, 1996). That is, 
information about a target is preferentially sought, interpreted, and recalled in ways that 
favor people’s expectations, ultimately leading them to believe that their expectations have 
been confirmed. Perceptual biases are the result of perceivers seeking, interpreting, and/or 
remembering a target’s behavior in ways that are consistent with their initially inaccurate 
expectations (Jussim et al., 1996). The following section presents an overview of the research 
pertaining to each of the biased assimilation processes (i.e., seeking, interpreting, and 
recalling).  
Seeking information. A perceptual bias may result because of the strategies that 
people use to determine whether or not their expectations are correct. That is, people may 
seek out information in specific ways that may unintentionally lead to a greater likelihood 
that they will leave an interaction believing that their expectations have been confirmed. One 
way that people may do this is by testing their hypotheses in a biased manner – that is, by 
looking for evidence that confirms rather than disconfirms the beliefs that they already hold 
to be true – a process sometimes referred to as a hypothesis confirmation bias or a positive 
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test strategy. For example, Snyder and Swann (1978) labeled some targets as extroverts and 
others as introverts. Perceivers were instructed to determine if these labels were correct by 
asking targets several questions from a larger pool of questions. Consistent with a hypothesis 
confirmation bias, perceivers who expected to interact with an extroverted target tended to 
ask the target questions that elicited an extroverted response. Likewise, perceivers who 
expected to interact with an introverted target tended to ask the target questions that elicited 
an introverted response. The tendency for people to use biased hypothesis testing strategies 
during social interactions has been replicated in studies using different expectations (Snyder, 
Campbell, & Preston, 1982; Snyder & White, 1981; Zuckerman, Knee, Hodgins, & Miyake, 
1995). Therefore, the type of evidence that perceivers seek can serve as one mechanism 
through which their expectations are believed to be confirmed. 
In addition, perceivers that start with an inaccurate expectation may test their 
expectations by using techniques that encourage people to provide hypothesis consistent 
information. Researchers have argued that using a hypothesis confirmation strategy can be a 
valid way of gathering information because targets still have the option of answering with a 
negative response and thus, provide evidence of disconfirmation (Trope & Mackie, 1987). 
However, research suggests that people have a tendency to provide more ‘yes’ than ‘no’ 
answers when being questioned and that this tendency, in conjunction with perceivers’ 
tendency to use hypothesis confirmation strategies, results in higher likelihood of 
confirmation (Zuckerman et al., 1995). 
People’s expectations and their tendency to look for confirmation may also influence 
the threshold for conducting a thorough search. People may stop searching for additional 
information at different points depending on whether the information is consistent versus 
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inconsistent with their expectations (Ditto & Lopez, 1992; Pyszczynski & Greenberg 1987). 
Less information is needed when it tends to confirm people’s expectations. In contrast, 
people may continue to search longer and exert more pressure on others when the 
information tends to disconfirm their expectations. For example, in one study participants 
were randomly assigned to play the role of a suspect or a detective (Kassin, Goldstein, & 
Savitsky, 2003). This study manipulated both the suspects’ guilt (i.e., innocent versus guilty) 
and the detectives’ expectations about the suspect’s guilt (i.e., innocent versus guilty). 
Results indicated that detectives who expected the suspect to be guilty tended to select more 
guilt-presumptive questions, use more interrogation techniques, and to use more aggressive 
interrogation techniques when they were questioning an innocent versus a guilty suspect. 
Naïve participants later judged detectives in that condition as exerting more effort and more 
pressure in their attempts to get the suspect to confess.  
Interpreting information. Once information has been gathered, people then have to 
interpret and evaluate that information. People’s expectations can bias their judgments of this 
information in ways that support their pre-existing expectations. The following section 
provides a brief overview of research examining the relationship between people’s 
expectations and the interpretation of information. 
First, people tend to interpret information as confirming their beliefs or expectations, 
especially when that information is ambiguous (see Olson et al., 1996; Nickerson, 1998 for 
reviews). For example, in one study sixth grade students were presented with drawings of 
two children engaging in an ambiguous behavior (Sagar & Schofield, 1980). The behavior 
was considered ambiguous because it could have been interpreted as a friendly behavior or as 
a mean and aggressive behavior. Researchers manipulated the race (i.e., African American 
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versus White) of the child engaged in the ambiguous behavior. Researchers found that 
participants judged the behavior as more mean and threatening when it was performed by an 
African American child versus a White child. This finding suggests stereotypes influenced 
participants’ interpretation of the same behavior of targets of different races. Although this 
finding is based on participants’ stereotype-based expectations, a similar pattern of results 
emerges based on participants’ target-based expectations (e.g., Bond, 1972; Ickes, et al., 
1982; Rosenthal & Jacobsen, 1968).  
Second, the way in which information is interpreted may be different depending on 
whether or not the information is consistent versus inconsistent with people’s expectations. 
People tend to judge disconfirming evidence as unreliable and irrelevant but confirming 
evidence as reliable and relevant (Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979). Disconfirming information is 
sometimes simply discounted or dismissed. For example, within the schema literature, 
researchers have noted that when people encounter discrepant information they may create 
subcategories as a way to preserve their existing belief structures (Weber & Crocker, 1983). 
At other times, disconfirming evidence is subject to more extensive processing in an effort to 
discredit it (Gilovich, 1991).  
In addition, people sometimes label disconfirming evidence as less diagnostic in 
explaining another’s behavior. Because perceivers are generally anticipating confirming 
evidence to surface, they may be surprised when the target behaves counter to their 
expectation. The target’s unexpected behavior may then be attributed to chance, as a 
response to the perceiver’s behavior, or as a self-presentational strategy (Hilton & Darley, 
1985; Miller & Ross, 1975; Nadler, Fisher, & Streufert, 1974; Weiner, 1986). By attributing 
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the target’s unexpected behavior to something other than an internal and stable characteristic, 
perceivers are more likely to believe their initial expectations have been confirmed.    
Recalling information. The research regarding how expectancies influence the recall 
of information is somewhat mixed and appears to be influenced by a variety of factors, such 
as perceivers’ motivation or the complexity of the information. In general, people tend to be 
better able to recall information that is both consistent and inconsistent with their 
expectations as long as it is deemed relevant rather than irrelevant (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). 
However, there is also research to suggest that people have better recall of information that is 
consistent rather than inconsistent with their expectations. For example, Rothbart, Evans, and 
Fulero (1979) presented participants with descriptions of behaviors associated with members 
of a group. Researchers led some participants to believe that descriptions were of members of 
a group that were either intellectual or friendly. Half of the participants were given this 
information before viewing the descriptions, whereas the other half was given this 
information after viewing the descriptions. The results indicated that participants who were 
induced with an expectation prior to viewing the descriptions showed better recall for 
behaviors that were consistent with their expectations than behaviors that were inconsistent 
with their expectations. Additionally, researchers have suggested that people tend to be 
motivated to recall more evidence that supports their pre-existing views rather than evidence 
that opposes their views (Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979).  
Conversely, there is also research suggesting that people are better able to recall 
information that is inconsistent with their expectations than information that is consistent (see 
Stangor & McMillan, 1992, for a meta-analysis). As mentioned previously, people may 
spend more time seeking information when that information appears to disconfirm their 
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expectations. Also, inconsistent information sometimes receives extended processing due to 
people’s attempts to discredit that information. Thus, it also makes sense that people would 
have better recall for inconsistent information. However, there appears to be limits to this 
effect. It may apply more to group-expectancies rather than to an individual (Stangor & 
Ruble, 1989) and over time the effect may even become reversed (Wyer & Martin, 1986). 
That is, people may be better able to recall inconsistent information at first, but over time 
become less able to do so. Thus, the effect of people’s expectations on their ability to recall 
information is multifaceted. However, as Hamilton et al (1990) note, even if people do have a 
better memory for inconsistent information, consistent information may still be having a 
greater impact on their evaluations.  
Processes Contributing to the Accumulation of Perceptual Bias Effects  
There are several processes that may be responsible for the relation between 
perceivers’ inaccurate expectations and the accumulation of perceptual bias effects. The 
following section provides a discussion of each of the proposed contributing processes and 
how they are related to the accumulation of perceptual bias effects. 
 Strengthening of biased assimilation processes. The accumulation of perceptual bias 
effects may occur because of a strengthening of biased assimilation processes. Each person’s 
efforts to examine the validity of his or her expectations may result in the greater likelihood 
of seeking, interpreting, and recalling information in a biased manner. Perceivers’ 
assessments of a target may be skewed because they are inadvertently employing methods 
that are biased by their expectations, which may result in the greater appearance of 
expectancy consistent information. If perceivers with similar expectations are both engaging 
in biased assimilation processes, then it becomes even more likely that seemingly 
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expectancy-consistent information will surface. For example, two perceivers both using a 
similar hypothesis confirmation strategy may uncover more information consistent with their 
expectations than either perceiver alone. 
 Consensus. Consensus across perceivers may also contribute to the accumulation of 
perceptual bias effects. Research on attribution theories have suggested that consensus is a 
factor that influences whether or not people’s behaviors are interpreted as being indicative of 
depositional qualities (Kelley, 1973). People may consider the opinions of others in 
determining whether their own opinions are correct. If they perceive consensus, then they 
may be more likely to engage in various biased assimilation processes. People may also have 
greater confidence in their judgments when others appear to be in agreement with them.  
Consensus can be conveyed through explicit verbalization of perceivers’ expectations 
for a target. However, there is also a wealth of research demonstrating the importance of 
covert communication in mediating the potential for a perceiver’s expectation to influence a 
target’s behavior (see Rosenthal, 2002 for a review). People’s expectations about a target can 
be expressed through their nonverbal behaviors, such as their tone of voice, amount of eye-
contact, posture, etc., without them ever explicitly mentioning their expectations. For 
example, Harris et al. (1994) had participants teach a task via videotape. Participants were 
led to believe that they were either teaching another college student or an elderly woman. 
Participants who believed they were teaching an elderly woman taught less material, were 
more nervous, and were less friendly than participants who believe they were teaching 
another college student. In turn, participants who watched tapes that were made for an elderly 
woman learned less than participants who watched tapes that were made for a college 
student. This suggests that the influence of perceivers’ expectations on targets’ behaviors 
19 
 
 
were mediated through the perceivers’ behavior. Similarly, it is possible that perceivers’ 
expectations may be conveyed to another perceiver to ultimately influence both perceivers’ 
impressions of the same target. 
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Chapter 4: Conceptual Model of the Accumulation of Perceptual Bias Effects 
Figure 1 presents a conceptual model describing the relations that may be involved in 
the accumulation of perceptual bias effects across perceivers. For simplicity, I present these 
relations for two perceivers and one target. However, the relations depicted could be 
extended to include any number of perceivers each of whom holds an inaccurate expectation 
about the same target. 
Inaccurate Expectations  
The model proposes that perceivers’ expectations influence both their expected 
behavior toward the target and also their impressions of the target. First, each perceiver’s 
expectation may influence decisions about how to behave towards a target (Paths a and b). 
For example, if perceivers falsely expect a target to be hostile, then they would, according to 
the model, be more likely to look for evidence of the target’s hostility. For example, 
perceivers’ anticipating how they will behave toward the target may decide to ask questions 
that would confirm their expectations, develop nonverbal strategies to elicit confirmation, 
and decide which behaviors would be used to infer confirmation (Snyder & Swann, 1978; see 
Trope & Liberman, 1996 for review).  
Second, each perceiver’s expectation about a target may influence on his or her 
subsequent impression of the target (Paths c and d). This influence reflects the stability of 
each perceiver’s expectation over time. That is, according to the model, perceivers’ 
expectations influence their impressions of the target even when they are given no 
opportunity to interact with the target. 
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Anticipating Interaction 
 The model proposes the perceivers’ anticipated ways of behaving toward the target 
has the potential to influence their impressions in three different ways. First, perceivers’ 
expectations for their own behavior toward a target may influence their impressions of the 
target independent of any interaction with the target (Paths e and f). For example, perceivers’ 
impressions of a target may be influenced by their plans for behaving with target even if they 
never have the opportunity to interact with the target. That is, their ideas about what would 
happen during the interaction and how major players in the interaction would act could 
influence their later impressions of the target. 
 Second, if prior to interacting with the target perceivers develop their strategies 
together, then they may communicate their expectations for the target to one another and 
thus, influence each other’s plans for interacting with the target (Paths g and h). In some 
situations the flow of information may be bidirectional as each perceiver expresses his or her 
opinions about the target and their plans for interacting with him or her. In other situations, 
only one perceiver may have access to the other’s opinions and plans for interacting with the 
target. Perceivers may communicate their expectations through the nature of the conversation 
or the questions they pose, their tone of voice, their posture, etc. 
 Third, perceivers’ strategies for how they would interact with the target can influence 
their actual behaviors toward the target (Paths i and j). Once perceivers have specified their 
plans for interacting with a target, they may be more committed to that course of action 
which may then influence their later impressions of the target (Moriarty, 1960).  
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Behaviors during a Social Interaction 
Perceivers may convey their expectations to other perceivers and to the target during 
a social interaction. The behaviors expressed during a social interaction can contribute to 
perceivers’ later impressions of a target in two ways. First, perceivers’ behaviors during the 
social interaction may influence perceivers’ impressions of a target independent of the 
target’s behavior (Paths k and l). For example, perceivers who act in a manner consistent 
with their expectation may convince themselves that their behavior was warranted (Davis & 
Jones, 1960). Thus, even if target’s display behaviors contrary to perceivers’ expectation, 
perceivers may still choose to believe their expectations by explaining away the target’s 
behavior. For instance, perceivers may simply decide to ignore the target’s behavior because 
they believe that the target is attempting to mislead them or because they do not believe they 
are adequately able to test their expectations. In this way, perceivers are able to rationalize 
their behavior and come to believe their expectations have been confirmed.   
Second, perceivers may influence a target’s behavior (Path m) and in turn that 
behavior may influence each perceiver’s subsequent impressions of him or her (Paths n and 
o). In this case, perceivers have acted on their expectations which have caused changes in the 
target’s behaviors. Perceivers may then use these changes as evidence that their expectations 
have been confirmed. In some situations, targets may behaviorally confirm perceivers’ 
expectations resulting in a self-fulfilling prophecy. The potential for a perceptual bias to 
occur exists when perceivers overestimate the degree to which the target confirmed their 
expectations. Regardless of whether or not a target behaves consistently with an expectation, 
a perceptual bias exists to the extent that perceivers’ impressions are based more on their 
expectations than on objective reality. 
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Paths to Accumulation.  
The potential for accumulation of perceptual bias effects occurs whenever perceivers 
have the opportunity to communicate their similar expectations to one another or through a 
target. Thus, according to this model, accumulation can occur prior to social interaction if 
perceivers are given an opportunity to communicate to one another or from any of the paths 
stemming from the social interaction.  
First, the opportunity for perceivers to communicate prior to social interaction means 
that the accumulation process may begin as perceivers anticipate how they will behave 
toward a target (Paths g and h). As mentioned previously, communication could be 
bidirectional or unidirectional. One perceiver’s expectation has the potential to contaminate 
the other’s expectation if their expectations are dissimilar or to result in the accumulation of 
perceptual bias effects if their expectations are similar. 
Second, accumulation may occur when perceivers’ behaviors during a social 
interaction influence a target’s behavior (Path g), which then influences perceivers’ 
subsequent impressions (Paths j and k). For example, perceivers who both expect the target to 
act in a hostile manner may treat the target in a hostile manner. The target may respond to 
this treatment in many different ways, such as by acting more hostile, ignoring perceivers’ 
behaviors, or acting non-hostile in an attempt to smooth over the interaction. It is possible 
that perceivers may interpret these various behaviors as confirming their expectations to a 
greater extent when perceivers have similar expectations than when they have dissimilar 
expectations or are acting alone.  
Third, accumulation of perceptual bias effects may occur through perceivers’ 
communication of their expectations without taking into consideration the target’s actual 
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behavior (Paths h and i). For example, perceivers acting on a shared expectation that a target 
is hostile may observe one another’s behaviors and use that as evidence that the target is 
hostile. In other words, each perceiver’s behavior may serve to justify the other’s treatment 
and impressions of the target.  
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Chapter 5: Experimental Overview in the Context of the Legal System 
Investigators and Perceptual Bias Effects 
Two studies were conducted to examine the accumulation of perceptual bias effects 
across perceivers. These studies were specifically designed to identify the source of the 
underlying mechanisms involved in the accumulation process. These issues were examined 
within the context of an important legal area, the interrogation of suspects.  
The recent discovery of numerous wrongful convictions has prompted those within 
the criminal justice system and researchers outside the system to investigate factors and 
procedures that may be contributing to these errors. The interrogation has been identified as 
one area in which problems may arise as a result of inaccurate expectations (e.g., Drizin & 
Leo, 2004; Findley & Scott, 2006; Kassin & Gudjonsson, 2004).  
Investigators, like all people, may be biased in their assessments of another individual 
because of their expectations and prior beliefs. Indeed, the situation in which investigators 
find themselves is one that encourages an expectation that suspects are guilty individuals 
who will likely lie and repeat their criminal behavior if given a chance (Leo, 1996a; Meissner 
& Kassin, 2002). Many investigators are trained to use the Reid Technique which includes an 
interview and interrogation process (Buckley, 2006). The objective of the interview is to 
gather information and to ‘size-up’ potential suspects. The objective of the interrogation is 
somewhat more complex as investigators simultaneously attempt to learn the truth while 
seeking to secure a confession. The interrogation takes place in a controlled environment and 
is characterized as accusatory and persuasive. Investigators are instructed not to interrogate a 
suspect until they are reasonably certain that the suspect is guilty. In fact, the first step in the 
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nine steps of the Reid interrogation begins with a confrontation in which the investigator 
makes it clear that he or she believes the suspect is guilty.  
On what basis do investigators determine whether or not suspects are guilty? 
Although Kassin (2006) notes that there are many instances in which decisions to interrogate 
suspects are clearly reasonable (i.e., based on the evidence, eye-witness testimony, etc.), in 
other instances investigators decisions may be based on mere hunches or speculation. During 
the interview, investigators may decide that a suspect is guilty because they believe that the 
suspect is attempting to deceive them in some way. However, research suggests that people 
are not particularly good at determining whether or not someone is lying (see Bond & 
DePaulo, 2006 for a meta-analysis). Additionally, most research suggests that investigators 
and other personnel trained in deception techniques perform at levels similar to laypersons 
(Garrido, Masip, & Herrero, 2004). Although there is some research suggesting that 
investigators are able to detect deception at levels above chance, accuracy levels are still far 
from perfect (Mann, Vrij, & Bull, 2004). Furthermore, there is evidence to indicate that the 
verbal and non-verbal behaviors specified in training manuals do not reliably distinguish liars 
from truth-tellers (Mann et al., 2004; Vrij, Mann & Fisher, 2006). Paradoxically, research 
also suggests that training tends to increase people’s confidence in their ability to detect lies, 
but does not lead to significant increases in people’s actual ability to detect lies (Kassin & 
Fong, 1999; Kassin, Meissner, & Norwick, 2005). Thus, there is the potential for 
investigators to interrogate suspects that have been erroneously labeled as guilty.  
Investigators’ expectations about suspects’ guilt becomes problematic when it 
prevents them from considering alternative theories (Findley & Scott, 2006). That is, when 
their expectations bias their evaluation of the evidence in a manner that is consistent with 
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their expectations. Thus, this is one area in which perceptual bias effects have the potential to 
occur. In addition, because investigators often work in teams there is also the potential for 
their individual perceptual bias effects to accumulate across team members.   
Overview of Experiments 
 The underlying mechanisms in the accumulation of perceptual bias effects were 
examined in two studies. As outlined in the theoretical model, the accumulation of perceptual 
bias effects may occur through changes in the target’s behavior or changes in perceivers’ 
behavior. These experiments held the target’s behavior constant and thus, only examined the 
accumulation process through changes in the perceivers’ behaviors or impressions. 
Perceivers’ expectations about a target suspect’s guilt were manipulated. Perceivers’ 
impressions of the suspect and potential underlying mechanisms involved in the 
accumulation process were examined in both experiments. Additionally, two preliminary 
studies were performed in order to examine these issues. 
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Chapter 6: Preliminary Study 1: Evaluating Criminal Cases 
Overview 
 The primary objective in the first preliminary study was to determine whether or not 
perceivers’ expectations about a target’s guilt were manipulated using case information. I 
addressed this issue by having participants read one of two versions of a murder case (Ask & 
Granhag, 2005). One version of the case provided information suggesting that there may be 
an alternative suspect who committed the murder. The other version of the case provided 
participants with a possible motive for the suspect to have committed the murder. I 
hypothesized that participants who received information that the suspect had a motive would 
be more likely to believe the suspect is guilty, have a more negative impression of the 
suspect, and be more likely to expect deceitful behavior from the suspect than participants 
who received information that there may be an alternative suspect who committed the 
murder. Information obtained in the first preliminary study was used to manipulate 
perceivers’ expectations in the main studies. 
Methods 
Participants 
 Twenty-six participants were recruited from the Psychology Department’s Research 
Participation Pool at Iowa State University. The sample included 10 males, 15 females, and 1 
participant who did not indicate gender. The mean age of participants was 20 and 
approximately 65% of the sample identified themselves as Caucasian. In exchange for their 
participation, students earned credit in their psychology courses.  
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Materials 
Manipulating expectations. Participants were given a case that provided information 
about a murder and a suspect (Appendix A). Two versions of this case were constructed to 
manipulate participants’ expectations for the suspect. One version presented information that 
suggested that there may be an alternative suspect in the case (i.e., weak case), whereas the 
other presented information that suggested that the suspect had a motive to have committed 
the crime (i.e., strong case). These cases have been used in previous research and were 
revised in the current research to increase clarity (Ask & Granhag, 2005). 
 Measuring expectations and impressions. A questionnaire was used to measure 
participants’ expectations and impressions of the suspect (Appendix B). Participants rated the 
extent to which they believed the suspect was intelligent, honest, moral, upset, truthful, 
calculating, unstable, warm, and a typical criminal on a six point scale with anchors 1 
(strongly disagree) and 6 (strongly agree). A global impression of the suspect was created by 
averaging the following items: intelligent, honest, moral, truthful, warm, and typical 
criminal, the latter of which was reversed coded. High scores indicate a more positive global 
impression of the suspect, α = .86. 
 Participants also responded to statements and questions focusing on their beliefs 
about the suspect’s guilt. The following four items were averaged to create a composite 
variable of suspect’s guilt: a) “I think Eva’s (suspect’s) description of what happened is 
believable.”, b) “During the interview with Eva, I would expect her to lie.”, c) “I believe Eva 
is responsible for the victim’s death, and d) “Eva is guilty.” Participants rated their agreement 
with these statements on a six point scale with anchors 1 (strongly disagree) and 6 (strongly 
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agree). Items were reversed coded as necessary so that high scores indicated a greater belief 
in the suspect’s guilt, α = .83. 
Procedure 
 Participants were run in groups, but completed all materials independently. Upon 
arriving at the experiment, participants were asked to read and sign a consent form. After 
consenting to participate, participants were instructed to read a criminal case from the 
perspective of an investigator. Participants were randomly assigned to either receive the 
weak case or the strong case. Participants were then asked to fill out questionnaires that 
assessed their expectations and impressions of the suspect, their demographic information 
(Appendix C), and their suspicion (Appendix D). Lastly, participants were debriefed and 
thanked for their participation. 
Results and Discussion 
Manipulating Expectations 
 Two independent samples t-tests were performed to examine whether participants’ 
impressions of the suspect would differ based on the type of case they received (i.e., weak 
versus strong). It was hypothesized that participants receiving the strong case would have 
less positive global impressions of the suspect and would be more likely to believe the 
suspect was guilty than participants receiving the weak case. In the first t-test, participants’ 
global impressions of the suspect served as the dependent variable. Consistent with the 
hypothesis, participants receiving the weak case (M = 3.51) had a more positive global 
impression of the suspect than participants receiving the strong case (M = 2.71), t (24) = 
2.70, p = .012, d = 1.06. 
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 In the second t-test, participants’ beliefs about the suspect’s guilt served as the 
dependent variable. Results indicated that there was not a significant difference in 
participants’ beliefs about the suspect’s guilt for those in the strong condition (M = 4.54) 
compared to those in the weak condition (M = 4.06), t (24) = 1.28, p = .214, d = .50, although 
the pattern of means was in the expected direction. 
The results of these analyses suggest some support for the hypothesis that the case 
would influence participants’ beliefs about the suspect. Participants who read the weak case 
had a more positive global impression of the suspect than participants who read the strong 
case. Although the difference in participants’ evaluations of the suspect’s guilt was not 
significantly different based on the version of the case read, the means were in the expected 
direction. It is possible, that the number of participants in each condition was not large 
enough to detect the difference in means. Indeed, the effect size of the case on beliefs about 
the suspect’s guilt was moderate. Regardless, it is important that the cases induce different 
expectations and yet be ambiguous enough to avoid ceiling effects which would reduce the 
possibility of finding accumulation effects. Thus, no changes were made to either of the two 
cases.  
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Chapter 7: Preliminary Study 2: Evaluating Techniques and Questions/Statements 
Overview 
 The primary objective of the second preliminary study was to determine participants’ 
perceptions of interview/interrogation techniques, questions, and statements. Participants 
were given a lists of techniques, questions, and statements and asked to rate the 
aggressiveness and guilt-presumptiveness of each one. This information was used to 
determine which techniques, questions, and statements were to be used in the main 
experiments.  
Methods 
Participants 
 Twenty participants were recruited from the Psychology Department’s Research 
Participation Pool at Iowa State University. The sample included 6 males and 14 females. 
The mean age of participants was 19 and approximately 95% of the sample identified 
themselves as Caucasian. In exchange for their participation, students earned credit in their 
psychology courses.  
Materials 
 Interrogation techniques, questions, and statements. A list of 20 
interview/interrogation techniques and a list of 30 interview/interrogation questions and 
statements were generated (see Tables 1 and 2, respectively). These lists contained both 
accusatory and non-accusatory items. The accusatory items were based on research 
descriptions of actual techniques used during interrogations (Leo, 199b) and those based on 
the Reid Technique (Inbau, Reid, Buckley, & Jayne, 2005). The non-accusatory items were 
created by experimenters. 
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Participants rated how aggressive each technique and question or statement was on a 
four point scale with anchors 1 (not at all aggressive) and 4 (very aggressive). Participants 
also rated how guilt presumptive each technique was responding to the following statement: 
“If an investigator used this technique, he or she was probably ___  that the suspect 
committed the crime.” A four point scale with anchors 1 (doubtful) and 4 (absolutely 
convinced) was provided to participants. The order in which each of the techniques were 
presented varied across dimensional ratings (i.e., aggressiveness and guilt-presumptiveness). 
In addition, the order in which dimensions were presented was counterbalanced. 
Procedures 
 Participants were run in groups, but completed all materials independently. Upon 
arriving at the experiment, participants were asked to read and sign a consent form. After 
consenting to participate, participants were given lists of techniques and questions and 
statements to evaluate. Participants were then asked to respond to questionnaires that 
assessed their demographic information (Appendix C) and their suspicion (Appendix D). 
Lastly, participants were debriefed and thanked for their participation. 
Results and Discussion 
 Table 1 presents participants’ mean ratings of the aggressiveness and guilt-
presumptiveness of each of the interview/interrogation techniques. Table 2 presents 
participants’ mean ratings of the aggressiveness and guilt-presumptiveness of each of the 
interview/interrogation questions and statements. Both tables indicate which items were 
originally designed to be accusatory and non-accusatory. 
Two sets of independent samples t-tests were conducted to examine whether 
participants would perceive the items in a manner consistent with the labels given by 
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experimenters. One set focused on the interview/interrogation techniques and the other set 
focused on the interview/interrogation questions and statements. In all analyses, the label of 
the item (i.e., accusatory or non-accusatory) served as the independent variable. Participants’ 
mean ratings of aggressiveness and guilt-presumptiveness were averaged separately based on 
the label of the items. For example, mean ratings of all techniques labeled as accusatory were 
averaged together and mean ratings of all techniques labeled as non-accusatory were 
averaged together. Thus, four variables were created and these variables served as the 
dependent variables. 
Results from the first set of t-tests indicated that participants rated the techniques 
labeled accusatory as more aggressive (M= 2.84) and guilt-presumptive (M = 2.89) than the 
techniques labeled non-accusatory (M = 1.57, M = 2.07, respectively), t (18) = 5.69, p < .001, 
d = 2.66; t (18) = 6.18, p < .001, d = 2.73, respectively. Results from the second set of t-tests 
indicated that participants rated the questions and statements labeled accusatory as more 
aggressive (M = 2.75) and guilt-presumptive (M= 3.03) than those labeled non-accusatory (M 
= 1.42, M = 1.94, respectively), t (28) = 6.75, p < .001, d = 2.46; t (28) = 8.14, p < .001, d = 
2.97, respectively. 
These results indicated that participants viewed the accusatory items as more 
aggressive and more guilt-presumptive than the non-accusatory items. Individual items were 
then ranked ordered based on participants’ mean ratings of their aggressiveness and guilt-
presumptiveness. Items that fell towards ends of the scales represent items that more clearly 
distinguished themselves as non-accusatory or accusatory, whereas items that fell towards the 
middle of the scales represent items that were more ambiguous. Based on these rankings, 
eight techniques were selected as accusatory and six techniques were select as non-
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accusatory. Table 1 indicates which techniques were selected for the main experiments. 
Eleven questions and statements were selected as accusatory and eleven questions and 
statements were selected as non-accusatory. Table 2 indicates which techniques were 
selected for the main experiments.  
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Chapter 8: Experiment 1: Accumulation through Prior Information 
Overview 
This experiment had two objectives. Its first objective was to determine if perceptual 
bias effects accumulate across perceivers in a situation in which explicit information about 
another’s impressions of the target is learned prior to developing one’s strategies for 
interacting with a target (see Figure 2). In the previous investigation of cumulative perceptual 
bias effects, perceivers took part in a face-to-face interaction in which their impressions of a 
target were communicated (Willard et al., 2008). In this experiment, impressions of a target 
are communicated through a bogus statement in which a purported other explicitly asserts his 
or her beliefs about a target. Thus, this experiment examined whether accumulation of 
perceptual bias effects was possible without face-to-face contact with a real perceiver and 
target. 
Its second objective was to examine the extent to which biased assimilation processes 
and consensus contributed to any observed accumulation pattern. Although the previous 
study provided evidence that suggested accumulation of perceptual bias effects was 
occurring, it did not provide any evidence for how that process was occurring (Willard et al., 
2008). Thus, this experiment sought to offer explanations as to how accumulation operates. 
These objectives were examined by influencing participants’ expectations about the 
suspect’s guilt and exposing some participants to a social influence situation. Following the 
procedures of Preliminary Study 1, participants’ expectations about the suspect’s guilt were 
manipulated with case information that led participants to believe either that (a) there was an 
alternative suspect who may have committed the crime (i.e., weak case) or (b) the suspect 
had a motive for committing the crime (i.e., strong case). Social influence was manipulated 
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with the presence or absence of a written statement pertaining to the suspect’s guilt, 
purportedly written by another participant. The written statement included no factual 
information and always matched the expectation that participants were given. That is, 
participants assigned to the weak expectation condition always received a written statement 
indicating that the other participant perceived the suspect to be not guilty, whereas 
participants assigned to the strong expectation condition always received a written statement 
indicating that the other participant perceived the suspect to be guilty; thus, placing 
participants in a situation in which they might be socially influenced. Consistent with an 
accumulation process, it was hypothesized that participants placed in a social influence 
situation would have beliefs and impressions of the suspect that were more in line with their 
expectations than those participants not placed in a social influence situation. Furthermore, it 
was hypothesized that participants in a social influence situation would engage in more 
biased assimilation processes than those not in a social influence situation. In addition, 
perceived consensus was expected to influence impressions of the suspect, beliefs about the 
suspect’s guilt, and perceiver’s confidence in their impressions. 
Methods 
Participants 
Participants consisted of 145 undergraduates recruited from the Psychology 
Department’s Research Participation Pool at Iowa State University. The sample included 88 
males, 56 females, and 1 participant who did not indicate gender. The mean age of 
participants was 20 and approximately 82% of the sample identified themselves as 
Caucasian. In exchange for their participation, students earned credit in their psychology 
courses.  
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Design 
Participants were assigned to a 2 (Expectation: weak versus strong) x 2 (Social 
influence: no social influence versus social influence) between subjects factorial design. 
Participants’ expectations of the suspect’s guilt were manipulated by giving them either a 
weak or strong case. Social influence was manipulated by not providing participants with 
information from a purported other or by providing participants with a bogus participant’s 
opinions about the suspect’s guilt. The condition in which participants received a weak 
expectation and no social influence is subsequently referred to as the weak-no social 
influence condition. The condition in which participants received a weak expectation and no 
social influence is subsequently referred to as the strong-no social influence condition. The 
condition in which participants received a weak expectation and social influence is 
subsequently referred to as the weak-social influence condition. The condition in which 
participants received a strong expectation and social influence is subsequently referred to as 
the strong- social influence condition. 
Materials 
 Manipulating expectations. The case information discussed in Preliminary Study 1 
was used to manipulate participants’ expectations in this experiment (Appendix A). 
Participants in the weak expectation conditions received a case that suggested that there was 
an alternative suspect in the case, whereas participants in the strong expectation conditions 
received a case that indicated the suspect had a motive for committing the crime.  
 Manipulating social influence. Participants in the no social influence conditions were 
never given any information that indicated another’s beliefs about the suspect’s guilt. 
Participants in the social influence conditions received a handwritten bogus statement 
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indicating another’s beliefs about the suspect’s guilt. This statement always matched the 
expectation induced, such that participants assigned to weak-social influence condition 
always received a statement that indicated the bogus participant believed the suspect was not 
guilty whereas participants assigned to the strong-social influence condition always received 
a statement that indicated the bogus participant believed the suspect was guilty (Appendix E).   
 Interrogation summary. A summary of an interview/interrogation with the suspect 
was created (Appendix J). This summary contains both vague and specific questions asked 
by a fictional investigator. In addition, it contains descriptions of the suspect’s behavior and 
reactions to questions. The summary was designed to be ambiguous and to contain no new 
information about the case. It was provided in order to examine whether participants would 
engage in the biased assimilation process of interpreting ambiguous information in a manner 
consistent with one’s expectation.  
Participants’ Impressions and Mechanisms Related to Accumulation 
 Manipulation checks. Three items served as a manipulation check of the expectation 
manipulation. Participants were given the following two statements that contained key 
information that distinguishing the weak case from the strong case: “Eva had a motive for the 
crime” and “The victim received phone calls in which a man threatened her.” (Appendix K) 
Participants responded by selecting true, unsure, or false. The third item measured whether 
the two cases influenced participants’ expectations of the suspect’s likelihood of lying. 
Participants rated their agreement with the statement “During an interview with Eva, I would 
expect her to lie.” on a six point scale with anchors 1 (strongly disagree) and 6 (strongly 
agree) (Appendix F). 
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 In addition, participants in the social influence conditions also responded to one item 
that was used to check whether they clearly differentiated between the not-guilty and guilty 
versions of the bogus participants’ statement. This item asked participants in the social 
influence condition to rate their agreement with the statement “Based on the participant’s 
written statement, I think he or she thought the suspect was guilty” (Appendix K).  
Participants made their ratings on a six point scale with anchors 1 (strongly disagree) and 6 
(strongly agree). 
Participants’ impressions of the suspect. Participants’ impressions of the suspect 
were measured by having them rate the extent to which they believed the suspect was 
intelligent, honest, moral, upset, truthful, calculating, unstable, warm, and a typical criminal 
(Appendix F). Participants rated their agreement with these adjectives describing the suspect 
on a six point scale with anchors 1 (strongly disagree) and 6 (strongly agree). An impression 
of the suspect was created by averaging the following items: intelligent, honest, moral, 
truthful, warm, and typical criminal. Participants’ responses to the typical criminal item were 
reversed coded so that high scores indicated a more positive impression of the suspect, α = 
.84. 
Participants’ beliefs about the suspect’s guilt. Participants’ beliefs about the suspect’s 
guilt were measured with three items (Appendix K). First, participants rated their agreement 
with the statement “Eva murdered the victim.” on a six point scale with anchors 1 (strongly 
disagree) and 6 (strongly agree). Second, participants circled either not guilty or guilty in 
response to the item “I believe Eva is...”. Third, participants circled either not convict or 
convict to the item “If I were on a jury and had to make a decision right now as to whether or 
not Eva should be convicted of the crime, my decision would be to...” This last item was 
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added after the study had begun; thus, the sample that answered this question is much smaller 
(n = 55). 
 Participants’ selection strategies. Four sets of measures assessed the extent to which 
participants sought information consistent with their expectations. The first set of measures 
consisted of 14 interview/interrogation techniques that were based on the results obtained 
from Preliminary Study 2. Eight of these techniques were accusatory and six were non-
accusatory. In order to keep the number of accusatory and non-accusatory techniques equal, 
two additional questions were added. Thus, this measure included 16 interrogation 
techniques in all (Appendices G and H). Another measure was constructed that included the 
same 16 techniques, but the order in which the techniques were presented was reversed. 
Participants were asked to select five techniques that they would use during an interrogation 
with the suspect. The number of techniques selected by participants measured the extent to 
which participants were seeking information in a manner consistent with their expectations. 
Higher scores indicate that a greater number of accusatory techniques were selected. 
 The second set of measures consisted of 22 interview/interrogation questions and 
statements that were based on the results obtained from Preliminary Study 2. Half of these 
items were accusatory and half were non-accusatory (see Table 2 or Appendix I). Participants 
were asked to select eight questions or statements that they would use during an interrogation 
with the suspect. Once again, the number of questions or statements selected measured the 
extent to which participants were seeking information consistent with their expectations. 
Higher scores indicated that a greater number of accusatory questions or statements were 
selected.  
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 The third set of measures consisted of the same 22 interview/interrogation questions 
and statements mentioned above. In Preliminary Study 2, each question or statement was 
evaluated by participants in terms of its aggressiveness and guilt-presumptiveness. Two 
variables were created on the basis of this information. One variable equaled the average 
item aggressiveness of questions and statements selected. Another variable equaled the 
average item guilt-presumptiveness of questions and statements selected. Scores could range 
from one to four with higher scores indicating that participants selected questions or 
statements with a greater degree of aggressiveness or guilt-presumptiveness.  
The fourth set of measures included two items that assessed participants’ goals and 
efforts in selecting techniques: “I selected techniques with the primary goal of getting the 
suspect to confess” and “I put a lot of thought into the interview/interrogation strategies that I 
selected.” Participants rated their agreement with these statements on a six point scale with 
anchors 1 (strongly disagree) and 6 (strongly agree). 
Participants’ interpretations. Four sets of items assessed the extent to which 
participants interpreted the case and the suspect’s behavior as described in the 
interview/interrogation summary as consistent with their expectations (Appendix K). 
Participants’ interpretation of the suspect’s behavior during the interview/interrogation (as 
described in the summary) was assessed with five items embedded among four other items. 
Participants rated the extent to which they believe the suspect was defensive, honest, 
friendly, truthful, and warm during the interview on a six point scale with anchors 1 (strongly 
disagree) and 6 (strongly agree). Participants’ responses to the defensive item were reversed 
coded so that high scores indicated a more positive interpretation of the suspect’s behavior, 
α = .74.  
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The second set of items measured participants’ beliefs about the truthfulness of the 
suspect: “Based on Eva’s behavior as described in the summary, I think she is telling the 
truth.” and “Eva’s denials were very convincing.” Participants indicated their agreement with 
these items on a six point scale with anchors 1 (strongly disagree) and 6 (strongly agree). 
Participants’ responses to these two items were averaged, r = .61, p < .001. High scores 
indicated greater belief in the suspect’s truthfulness. 
The third set of items measured participants’ perceptions of the strength of the case 
evidence: a) “It is likely at this point that I would continue investigating the crime in order to 
look for alternative suspects.”, b) “I think that Eva’s account of the event is plausible.”, c) “I 
believe there is enough evidence to arrest Eva for committing the crime.”, and d) “The 
evidence against Eva is very persuasive.” Participants indicated their agreement with these 
items on a six point scale with anchors 1 (strongly disagree) and 6 (strongly agree). 
Responses to the first two items were reversed coded and then responses to the four items 
were averaged. High scores indicate stronger beliefs about the strength of the evidence 
against the suspect, α = .56. 
The fourth item measured the participants’ perceptions about the consistency between 
their expectations and the behavior displayed by the suspect in the interview/interrogation 
summary. Participants rated their agreement with the statement “Eva behaved as I expected 
during the interview/interrogation (i.e., summary).” on a six point scale with anchors 1 
(strongly disagree) and 6 (strongly agree). 
Participants’ memory. A list of 11 statements was constructed to measure bias in 
participants’ memory (Appendix K). Some of the statements were true, some were false, and 
some were not specified by the case. Next to each statement participants indicated whether it 
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was true, false, or if they were unsure. Seven of the items were then used to create an index 
of bias, presented in Table 3. If items were accurately remembered or if participants indicated 
unsure responses, then their responses were coded as 0. If items were inaccurate in a 
direction that suggested the suspect was not guilty, then their responses were coded as -1. If 
items were inaccurate in a direction that suggested the suspect was guilty, then their 
responses were coded as 1. For example, the statement “Eva called the police” was a false 
statement. Participants that indicated that this was false or were unsure were given a 0 code. 
Participants that indicated that this was true would be incorrect and the direction suggested 
the suspect was not guilty; thus, they were given a -1 code. Participants’ coded responses 
were summed and could range from -5 to +5. Codes for each of the items can be found in 
Appendix G. Four of the items were excluded from this index because incorrect responses 
could not be assigned a direction of bias. 
Certainty. Two items measured participants’ certainty through confidence.  
Participants’ confidence was assessed with the following two items: “I am confident in my 
assessment of Eva’s guilt” and “I am confident that Eva is the true culprit in this crime” 
(Appendix K).  Participants indicated their agreement with these items on a six point scale 
with anchors 1 (strongly disagree) and 6 (strongly agree). 
Perceived consensus. Participants’ perceived consensus was only measured for those 
in the social influence conditions. Consensus was assessed through participants’ perceptions 
of how similar their opinions were to the bogus participants’ opinions (Appendix K). 
Participants answered the following question “The other participant and I have similar 
opinions about the case.” Participants also answered another other item related to consensus 
but used for exploratory purposes: “The other participant made a convincing argument.” 
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Participants indicated their agreement with these items on a six point scale with anchors 1 
(strongly disagree) and 6 (strongly agree).  
Procedures 
 Participants independently completed materials alone or in small groups. Upon 
arrival, participants were asked to read and sign a consent form. After consenting to 
participate, participants were told that they would be evaluating a real criminal case from the 
perspective of an investigator. Participants were then handed a stack of folders and asked to 
follow additional instructions contained within the folders. Participants’ expectations about 
the suspect’s guilt were manipulated by having them to read either the weak or strong 
versions of the case (Appendix A). Next, social influence was manipulated. Participants in 
the social influence conditions received a handwritten statement from a purported participant 
that indicated his or her impressions about the suspect’s guilt (Appendix E). This bogus 
statement matched the expectation induced (i.e., not-guilty for participants assigned to the 
weak- social influence expectation condition and guilty for participants assigned to the 
strong-social influence expectation condition). Participants in the no social influence 
conditions did not receive this information. Experimenters were blind to condition until the 
completion of the study. 
Participants then completed a questionnaire that asked about their initial impressions 
of the case (Appendix F). Next, participants received the list of interview/interrogation 
techniques and interview/interrogation questions and statements (Appendices H and I). 
Participants were instructed to select five techniques and eight questions and statements they 
would use if given the opportunity to talk to the suspect. Participants were instructed to select 
techniques, questions, and statements that would help them uncover the truth and, if they 
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believed the suspect was guilty, to get the suspect to confess. After making their selections, 
participants received information that indicated the experimenters had access to the real 
interview with the suspect. However, participants were told that due to time constraints, they 
will only be reading a brief summary of the interview-interrogation (Appendix J). After 
reading the summary, participants were given questionnaires that assessed the following: 
their impressions of the suspect’s guilt, interpretation of information, memory of evidence, 
certainty, consensus (Appendix K), demographic information (Appendix C), and suspicion 
(Appendix D). Finally, participants were debriefed and thanked for their participation. 
Results 
Preliminary Analyses 
 Assessing  suspicion. Ten participants in the social influence conditions believed that 
the purpose of the study was to examine how they would be influenced by others’ beliefs. 
These participants were split evenly across expectation conditions. Analyses were conducted 
with and without these participants. The pattern of results remained the same; therefore, all 
ten of these participants were included in subsequent analyses. One participant indicated a 
disbelief in the authenticity of the social influence provided and was thus removed from 
subsequent analyses.  
Expectation manipulation. Two sets of analyses were conducted to determine if the 
weak and strong cases influenced participants’ expectations about the suspect’s guilt in the 
manner intended. First, two frequency analyses were conducted to examine whether 
participants were aware of the key information that served to manipulate their expectations. 
Specifically, participants who received the weak case were exposed to information stating 
that the victim had received threatening phone calls from another person, thereby suggesting 
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that there was an alternative suspect in the case. If participants who received the weak case 
indicated that this was a false statement, then their response was incorrect (n = 1). 
Participants who received the strong case were exposed to information stating the victim had 
a motive for committing the crime. If participants who received the strong case indicated that 
this was a false statement, then their response was incorrect (n = 2). Three participants 
responded incorrectly to one of these items and were excluded from all subsequent analyses. 
The final sample breakdown, including gender information, is presented in Table 4.  
Second, I examined whether the two cases induced different expectations about the 
suspect. I hypothesized that participants receiving the strong case would be more likely to 
expect the suspect to lie during an interview than participants receiving the weak case. An 
independent samples t-test was conducted in which expectation condition (i.e., weak versus 
strong) served as the independent variable and participants’ agreement with a statement 
indicating whether they expected the suspect to lie served as the dependent variable. 
Consistent with the hypothesis, participants receiving the strong case were more likely to 
expect the suspect to lie (M = 4.23) than participants receiving the weak case (M = 3.66), t 
(138) = 3.86, p < .001, d = .65. This suggests that the cases had effectively induced different 
expectations of the suspect’s guilt. 
Social influence manipulation. I performed a t-test to determine if there was a 
significant difference in participants’ perceptions of the bogus participant’s statement (i.e., 
not guilty versus guilty statements). I hypothesized that participants assigned to the strong-
social influence conditions would be more likely to believe that the bogus participant thought 
the suspect was guilty than participants assigned to the weak-social influence condition. An 
independent samples t-test was conducted to examine this hypothesis among participants in 
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the social influence conditions. The version of social influence (i.e., not-guilty versus guilty) 
served as the independent variable and participants’ beliefs about the bogus participant’s 
opinions about the suspect’s guilt served as the dependent variable. Consistent with the 
hypothesis, participants in the strong-social influence condition believed that the bogus 
participant thought the suspect was guiltier (M = 4.88) than participants in the weak-social 
influence condition (M = 2.69), t (64) = 6.20, p < .001, d = 1.52. This suggests that 
participants were able to accurately determine the bogus participants’ opinions about the 
suspect.  
Descriptive information. Correlations, means, and standard deviations for the primary 
measures are presented in Table 5. 
Accumulation of Perceptual Bias Effects 
Four sets of analyses focusing on participants’ impressions of the suspect and of the 
suspect’s guilt were conducted to examine the hypothesis that perceptual bias effects 
accumulate across perceivers. In these analyses, expectation (i.e., weak versus strong) and 
social influence (i.e., no social influence versus social influence) served as the independent 
variables. In order for accumulation to occur, results should indicate a main effect of 
expectation, such that those in the strong expectation conditions have less positive 
impressions of the suspect and greater beliefs about the suspect’s guilt than those in the weak 
expectation conditions. Results should also indicate an interaction effect between expectation 
and social influence such that participants’ impressions of the suspect and the suspect’s guilt 
are most negative in the strong-social influence condition, followed by the strong-no social 
influence condition, weak-no social influence condition, and weak-social influence condition, 
respectively. 
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Accordingly, when these analyses yielded a significant interaction between 
expectation and social influence, planned contrasts were performed to test whether the 
pattern of means supported the accumulation hypothesis. One planned contrast examined 
participants’ responses to the dependent variables in the weak-social influence condition 
compared to those in the weak-no social influence condition. Results would support the 
accumulation hypothesis if participants in the weak-social influence condition had more 
positive impressions of the suspect and the suspect’s guilt than participants in the weak-no 
social influence conditions (i.e., weak-social influence condition > weak-no social influence 
condition). The other planned contrast examined differences in participants’ responses to the 
dependent variables in the strong-social influence condition compared those in the strong-no 
social influence condition. Results would support the accumulation hypothesis if participants 
in the strong-social influence condition had less positive impressions of the suspect and the 
suspect’s guilt than participants in the strong-no social influence condition (i.e., strong-
similar social influence < strong-no social influence condition). 
I first tested the accumulation hypothesis with a 2 (Expectation: weak versus strong) 
x 2 (Social influence: no social influence versus social influence) analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) in which the dependent variable was participants’ impressions of the suspect. As 
shown in Table 6, results indicated that there was a main effect of expectation, F (1, 136) = 
15.07, p < .001, η2 = .10. Participants given a weak expectation had more positive 
impressions of the suspect (M = 3.79) than participants given a strong expectation (M = 
3.35). There was no main effect of social influence, F (1, 136) = .01, p = .919,  η2 < .01, nor 
an interaction effect between expectation and social influence, F (1, 136) = 3.02, p = .084, 
 η
2
 = .02.  
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I next tested the accumulation hypothesis with a 2 (Expectation: weak versus strong) 
x 2 (Social influence: no social influence versus social influence) ANOVA in which 
participants’ agreement with the statement “Eva murdered the victim” served as the 
dependent variable. As shown in Table 6, results indicated that there was not a main effect of 
expectation, F (1, 133) = 1.40, p = .238, η2 = .01, of social influence F (1, 133) = .40, p = 
.531, η2 < .01, nor an interaction effect between expectation and social influence, F (1, 133) 
= 1.02, p = .314, η2 = .01. 
 I also tested the accumulation hypothesis with a chi-square analysis in which 
participants’ responses to the dichotomous question pertaining to the suspect’s guilt (i.e., not 
guilty versus not guilty) served as the dependent variable. As shown in Figure 4, the pattern 
did not conform to an accumulation pattern, χ2 (139) = 5.23, p = .137, ϕ = .20. Although the 
percentage of participants who believed the suspect was guilty was the lowest for those in the 
weak-similar social information condition (46%), it was not highest among those in the 
strong-similar social information condition (68%). 
 Lastly, I performed another chi-square analysis to examine participants’ willingness 
to convict the suspect. For this analysis, participants’ responses to the dichotomous question 
of whether or not to convict the suspect served as the dependent variable. As shown in Figure 
5, this pattern did not conform to an accumulation pattern, χ2 (65) = 8.49, p = .204, ϕ = .36. 
Although the percentage of participants who choose to convict the suspect was lowest for 
those in the weak-similar social information condition (21%), it was not highest among those 
in the strong-similar social information condition (47%). 
 The pattern of data across each of these analyses is not consistent with an 
accumulation process. However, in order for accumulation to occur, participants must believe 
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that someone else’s beliefs about a given target are similar to their own beliefs about the 
target. The social influence conditions were designed to maximum the chances of agreement 
by matching the type of induced expectation with the type of social influence given to 
participants. That is, participants in the social influence conditions either received the weak 
case and information that the bogus person thought the suspect was not-guilty or received the 
strong case and information that the bogus person thought the suspect was guilty. It is 
possible, however, that despite my attempts to ensure that participants in the social influence 
conditions received information that was similar to their expectations, participants may have 
held beliefs about the suspect’s guilt that were counter to those of the bogus participant’s. If 
participants believed that their own beliefs were dissimilar from the bogus participant’s 
beliefs, then the accumulation process should not occur. Thus, in the following section I first 
identify participants who believed they held similar beliefs and reanalyze the data according 
to procedures identified earlier. 
Identifying perceived similarity. I identified participants who held similar and 
dissimilar beliefs by examining their agreement with the following statement: “The other 
participant and I have similar opinions about the case.” Frequency analyses indicated that 36 
participants somewhat agreed to strongly agreed with this statement. Of these participants 19 
were from the weak-social influence condition, subsequently referred to as the weak-similar 
social influence condition, and 17 were from the strong-social influence condition, 
subsequently referred to as the strong-similar social influence condition. The remaining 29 
participants somewhat disagreed to strongly disagreed with the statement. Of these 
participants, 13 were from the weak-social influence condition, subsequently referred to as 
the weak-dissimilar social influence condition, and 16 were from the strong-social influence 
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condition, subsequently referred to as the strong-dissimilar social influence condition. Seven 
participants failed to respond to this statement and were placed in the similar conditions after 
analyses indicated similar results with or without them. Thus, the final sample size of weak-
similar social influence condition was 24 and the final sample size of strong-similar social 
influence condition was 19. All subsequent analyses exclude participants in the weak-
dissimilar and strong-dissimilar social influence conditions except where noted. 
Accumulation of Perceptual Bias Effects among Those with Similar Beliefs. 
I first tested the accumulation hypothesis with a 2 (Expectation: weak versus strong) 
x 2 (Social influence: no social influence versus social influence) analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) in which the dependent variable was participants’ impressions of the suspect. As 
shown in Table 7, results showed a significant main effect for expectation, F (1, 108) = 
19.39, p < .001, η2 = .15. Participants given a weak expectation had more positive 
impressions of the suspect (M = 3.87) than participants given a strong expectation (M = 
3.30). Results revealed no main effect for social influence, F (1, 108) = .10, p = .098, 
η
2
 < .01. However, there was a significant interaction between expectation and social 
influence, F (1, 108) = 6.57, p = .012, η2 = .05. Means were consistent with an accumulation 
pattern (Ms = 4.06weak-similar social influence, 3.68 weak-no social influence, 3.44 strong-no social influence, 3.15 
strong-similar social influence). Accordingly, the two planned contrasts described above were 
performed.  
The results of these contrasts supported the accumulation hypothesis. Specifically, 
they showed that: (1) participants in the weak-similar social influence condition had 
significantly more positive impressions of the suspect (M = 4.01) than participants in the 
weak-no social influence condition (M = 3.68), t (108) = 2.09, p = .039, d = 1.43 and (2) 
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participants in the strong-similar social influence condition had less positive impressions of 
the suspect (M = 3.15) than did participants in the weak-no social influence condition (M = 
3.44), though this difference did not attain statistical significance, t (108) = 1.55, p = .124, d 
= .42.  
I next tested the accumulation hypothesis with a 2 (Expectation: weak versus strong) 
x 2 (Social influence: no social influence versus social influence) ANOVA in which 
participants’ agreement with the statement “Eva murdered the victim” served as the 
dependent variable. As shown in Table 7, results indicated a significant main effect of 
expectation, F (1, 104) = 9.87, p = .002, η2 =.08. Participants given a strong expectation were 
more likely to believe the suspect murdered the victim (M = 3.78) than participants given a 
weak expectation (M = 3.12). There was no main effect of social influence, F (1, 04) = .01, p 
= .910, η2 < 01. However, there was a significant interaction between expectation and social 
influence, F (1, 108) = 8.92, p = .004, η2 = .07. Means were also consistent with an 
accumulation pattern (Ms = 2.18weak-similar social influence, 3.42 weak-no social influence, 3.46 strong-no social 
influence, 4.11 strong-similar social influence). Therefore, the two planned contrasts were conducted to 
examine whether the pattern of this interaction supported the accumulation hypothesis.  
Consistent with an accumulation process, (1) participants in the weak-similar social 
influence condition were less likely to believe the suspect murdered the victim (M = 2.82) 
than those is the weak-no social influence condition (M = 3.42), t (104) = 2.09, p = .039, d = 
.57 and  (2) participants in the strong-similar social influence condition were more likely to 
believe the suspect murdered the victim (M = 4.11) than those in the strong-no social 
influence condition (M = 3.46), t (104) = 2.14, p = .035, d = .86. 
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 I also tested the accumulation hypothesis with a chi-square analysis in which 
participants’ responses to the dichotomous question pertaining to the suspect’s guilt (i.e., not 
guilty versus not guilty) served as the dependent variable. As shown in Figure 6, the pattern 
appears conforms to an accumulation pattern, χ2 (110) = 12.95, p = .005, ϕ = .34. The 
percentage of participants who believed the suspect was guilty was the lowest for those in the 
weak-similar social information condition (33%) and highest for those in the strong-similar 
social information condition (83%). Two partitioned chi-square analyses were conducted to 
examine whether the pattern supported the accumulation hypothesis.  
The first analysis yielded results that were consistent with an accumulation process. 
Participants in the weak-similar social influence condition were less likely to believe the 
suspect was guilty (33%) than those is the weak-no social influence condition (67%), χ2 (56) 
= 12.95, p = .005, ϕ = .32. The second analysis yielded results that were less consistent with 
an accumulation process. Although the frequencies were in the expected direction, 
participants in the strong-similar social influence condition were not significantly more likely 
to believe the suspect murdered the victim (83%) than those in the strong-no social influence 
condition (69%), χ2 (54) = 1.21, p = .272, ϕ = .15. 
 Lastly, I performed another chi-square analysis to examine participants’ willingness 
to convict the suspect. For this analysis, participants’ responses to the dichotomous question 
of whether or not to convict the suspect served as the dependent variable. As shown in Figure 
5, this pattern also conformed to an accumulation pattern, (80%), χ2 (55) = 11.15, p = .011, ϕ 
= .45. The percentage of participants who choose to convict the suspect was lowest for those 
in the weak-similar social information condition (18%) and highest for those in the strong-
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similar social information condition. Two partitioned chi-square analyses were conducted to 
examine whether the pattern supported the accumulation hypothesis. 
Both of these analyses yielded results that were inconsistent with an accumulation 
process. Although the frequencies were in the expected direction, participants in the weak-
similar social influence condition were not significantly less likely to believe the suspect was 
guilty (18%) than those is the weak-no social influence condition (28%), χ2 (29) = .34, p = 
.558, ϕ = .11, and participants in the strong-similar social influence condition were not 
significantly more likely to believe the suspect murdered the victim (80%) than those in the 
strong-no social influence condition (56%), χ2 (26) = 1.53, p = .216, ϕ = .24. 
 Overall, the pattern of data across each of the analyses is consistent with an 
accumulation process. Although there was not always a significant difference in means 
between the weak-no social influence condition and the weak-social influence condition or 
between the strong-no social influence condition and the strong-social influence condition, 
the main effect of expectation and the interactions between expectation and social influence 
were significant. Thus, in the following section I examine potential processes that may have 
contributed to the accumulation of perceptual bias effects observed in these data. 
Mechanisms Underlying the Cumulative Effects of Perceptual Biases 
Several analyses were conducted to examine whether biased assimilation and 
consensus processes contributed to the observed accumulation pattern. Analyses first focused 
on the three biased assimilation processes of seeking, interpreting, and remembering 
information consistent with one’s hypothesis. Analyses next focused on whether consensus 
contributed to the accumulation pattern observed. Many of the analyses were conducted 
using similar procedures to those outlined in the accumulation results section in which main 
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effects and an interaction effect between participants’ expectation and social influence was 
examined. In order for a process to be contributing to the accumulation pattern observed, 
results would indicate a main effect of expectation and an interaction effect between 
expectation and social influence. Significant interaction effects were followed by (1) same 
two planned contrasts described in the previous section and (2) regression analyses testing 
for mediation. The analytic plan for regression analyses are described below. 
The regression analyses were designed to test whether participants’ interpretations 
mediated the effect of expectation and social influence on participants’ impressions of the 
suspect and their beliefs about the suspect murdering the victim. This issue was addressed 
with a new variable, subsequently referred to as condition, was created on the basis of 
participants’ level of expectation and level of social influence. The following codes were 
used to this variable: 1 for participants in the weak-similar social influence condition, 2 for 
participants in the weak-no social influence condition, 3 for participants in the strong-no 
social influence condition, and 4 for participants in the strong-similar social influence 
condition.  
Two sets of analyses were conducted using procedures delineated by Baron & Kenny 
(1986). Specifically, in separate analyses, the dependent variables (i.e., participants 
impressions of the suspect and their beliefs about the suspect murdering the victim) were 
regressed on condition. Second, the potential mediator was regressed on condition. Third, the 
dependent variables were regressed on the potential mediator. Fourth, the dependent 
variables were regressed on both condition and the potential mediator. 
Seeking. Four sets of analyses were conducted to examine whether participants were 
preferentially seeking information consistent with their expectations and whether this was 
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occurring to a greater extent in the social influence conditions. These analyses focused on the 
number of accusatory interview/interrogation techniques selected, the number of accusatory 
interview/interrogation questions and statements selected, the average item-aggressiveness of 
interview/interrogation questions and statements selected, and the average item-guilt-
presumptiveness of interview/interrogation questions and statements selected by participants.  
First, I performed a 2 (Expectation: weak versus strong) x 2 (Social influence: no 
social influence versus social influence) ANOVA in which the dependent variable was the 
number of accusatory interview/interrogation techniques selected by participants. As shown 
in Table 8, results indicated neither significant main effects for expectation and social 
influence, Fs (1, 107) < 3.60, ps > .060, η2s < .03 nor an interaction between these variables 
F (1, 107) = .11, p = .74, η2 < 01.  
Second, I performed a 2 (Expectation: weak versus strong) x 2 (Social influence: no 
social influence versus social influence) ANOVA in which the dependent variable was the 
number of accusatory interview/interrogation questions and statements selected by 
participants. As shown in Table 8, this analysis revealed a main effect of expectation, F (1, 
101) = 4.25, p = .042, η2 = .04. Participants selected a greater number of accusatory 
questions and statements when given a strong expectation (M = 3.49) than when given a 
weak expectation (M = 2.87). Results revealed no main effect of social influence, F (1, 101) 
= .18, p = .675, η2 < .01 and no interaction between expectation and social influence, F (1, 
101) = .72, p = .400, η2 = .01.  
Third, I performed a (Expectation: weak versus strong) x 2 (Social influence: no 
social influence versus social influence) ANOVA in which the average item-aggressiveness 
of interview/interrogation questions and statements selected by participants served as the 
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dependent variable. As shown in Table 8, the pattern of results is similar to those indicated 
by the previous analysis. Results revealed a main effect of expectation, F (1, 105) = 4.11, p = 
.045, η2 = .04. Participants selected items with greater aggressiveness scores when given a 
strong expectation (M = 2.00) than when given a weak expectation (M = 1.88). There was no 
main effect of social influence, F (1, 105) < .01, p = .953, η2 < .01, nor an interaction 
between expectation and social influence, F (1, 105) = .05, p = .819, η2 < 01. 
Lastly, I performed 2 (Expectation: weak versus strong) x 2 (Social influence: no 
social influence versus social influence) ANOVA in which the average item-guilt-
presumptiveness of interview/interrogation questions and statements selected by participants 
served as the dependent variable. As shown in Table 8, Results revealed a marginally 
significant main effect of expectation, F (1, 105) = 3.71, p = .057, η2 < .01. Participants 
selected items with greater guilt-presumptiveness scores when given a strong expectation (M 
= 2.22) than when given a weak expectation (M = 2.33). There was no main effect of social 
influence, F (1, 105) = .03, p = .861, η2 = .03, nor an interaction between expectation and 
social influence, F (1, 105) < .01, p = .972, η2 < 01. 
The results of these four analyses suggest that the tendency for people to seek 
information consistent with their hypothesis does not account for the accumulation pattern 
observed in these data.  
Interpreting. I performed three sets of analyses to examine the hypothesis that 
participants would interpret information more consistently with their expectation, especially 
when socially influenced. These analyses focused on participants’ impressions of the suspect 
based on the behavior described in the interview/interrogation summary, participants’ 
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evaluations of the suspect’s truthfulness, and participants’ beliefs about the strength of the 
evidence against the suspect.  
The first 2 (Expectation: weak versus strong) x 2 (Social influence: no social 
influence versus social influence) ANOVA examined whether interpretation biases 
contributed to the observed accumulation effects with respect to participants’ impressions of 
the suspect’s behavior during the interview/interrogation. As shown in Table 9, results 
indicated no significant effects, Fs (1, 108) < 2.85, ps > .094, η2s < .03 
The second 2 (Expectation: weak versus strong) x 2 (Social influence: no social 
influence versus social influence) ANOVA examined whether interpretation biases 
contributed to the observed accumulation effects with respect to participants’ evaluation of 
the suspect’s truthfulness. As shown in Table 9, results revealed a significant main effect of 
expectation, F (1, 108) = 8.30, p = .005, η2 = .07. Participants in the weak conditions 
believed the suspect to be more truthful based on the interview-interrogation summary (M = 
3.46) than participants in the strong conditions (M = 2.58). There was no main effect of 
social influence, F (1, 108) = .47, p = .493, η2 < .01. However, there was a significant 
interaction effect, F (1, 108) = 4.31, p = .040, η2 = .04. The pattern of means were consistent 
with an accumulation hypothesis (Ms = 3.46weak-similar social influence, 3.21 weak-no social influence, 3.07 
strong-no social influence, 2.58 strong-similar social influence). Accordingly, the two planned contrasts 
described earlier were performed and a series of regression analyses were performed. 
The results of these contrasts did not support the biased assimilation process of 
interpretation as contributing to accumulation effects. Specifically, they showed that: (1) 
participants in the weak-similar social influence condition were not significantly more likely 
to believe the suspect was truthful (M = 3.46) than participants in the weak-no social 
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influence condition (M = 3.21), t (108) = 1.01, p = .315, d = .26 and (2) participants in the 
strong-similar social influence condition were not significantly less likely to believe the 
suspect was truthful (M = 2.58) than participants in the strong-no social influence condition 
(M = 3.07), t (108) = 1.90, p = .060, d = .56.  
Results of the regression analyses suggested that participants’ beliefs about suspect’s 
truthfulness may have only slightly contributed to the accumulation effects observed. 
Following the analytic plan outlined earlier, in the first step I regressed the dependent 
variables on the independent variable. Results indicated that condition predicted participants’ 
impressions of the suspect, F(1, 110) = 22.54, p = .001, B = -.29, and participants’ beliefs 
about the suspect murdering the victim, F(1, 106) = 12.88, p = .001, B = .37. In the second 
step I regressed the potential mediator on the independent variable. Results showed that 
condition predicted participants’ beliefs about the suspect’s truthfulness, F(1, 110) = 9.74, p 
= .002, B = -.27. In the third step the dependent variables were regressed on the potential 
mediator. These results indicated that participants’ beliefs about the suspect’s truthfulness 
predicted participants’ impressions of the suspect, F(1, 110) = 32.70, p < .001, B = .37 and 
participants’ beliefs about the suspect murdering the victim, F(1, 106) = 69.32, p < .001, B = 
-.75.In the final step the dependent variables were regressed on the independent variable and 
the potential mediator. A shown in Table 10, the results from these analyses indicated that 
the effect of condition on participants impressions of the suspect, B = -.21, p < .001, and their 
beliefs about the suspect murdering the victim, B = .19, p = .031, remained significant with 
the inclusion participants’ beliefs about the suspect’s truthfulness.  
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The third 2 (Expectation: weak versus strong) x 2 (Social influence: no social 
influence versus social influence) ANOVA examined whether interpretation biases 
contributed to the observed accumulation effects with respect to participants’ beliefs about 
the strength of the evidence. As shown in Table 9, results indicated a main effect of 
expectation, such that those with a strong expectation rated the evidence as more indicative 
of guilt (M = 3.37) than those with a weak expectation (M = 2.81), F (1, 108) = 19.70, p < 
.001, η2 = 15. There was no main effect of social influence, F (1, 108) = .08, p = .778, η2 < 
.01. However, there was a significant interaction effect, F (1, 108) = 4.81, p = .030, η2 = .04 
and the pattern of means were in the expected direction (Ms = 2.65weak-similar social influence, 2.96 
weak-no social influence, 3.25 strong-no social influence, 3.49 strong-similar social influence). Thus, two planned 
contrasts and a series of regression analyses were performed. 
The results of these contrasts somewhat support the biased assimilation process of 
interpretation as contributing to accumulation effects. Specifically, they showed that: (1) 
participants in the weak-similar social influence condition believed the evidence against the 
suspect was weaker (M = 2.65) than participants in the weak-no social influence condition 
(M = 2.96), t (108) = 2.20, p = .030, d = .50; (2) however, participants in the strong-similar 
social influence condition were not significantly more likely to believe the evidence against 
the suspect was stronger (M = 3.49) than participants in the strong-no social influence 
condition (M = 3.07), t (108) = 1.36, p = .191, d = .36.   
Results of the regression analyses suggested that participants’ beliefs about the 
strength of the evidence contributed to the accumulation effects observed. In the first step I 
regressed the dependent variables on the independent variable. These results are identical to 
those yielded earlier which indicated that condition predicted participants’ impressions of the 
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suspect, F(1, 110) = 22.54, p = .001, B = -.29, and participants’ beliefs about the suspect 
murdering the victim, F(1, 106) = 12.88, p = .001, B = .37. In the second step I regressed the 
potential mediator on the independent variable. Results showed that condition predicted 
participants’ beliefs about the strength of the evidence, F(1, 110) = 21.90, p < .001, B = .28. 
In the third step the dependent variables were regressed on the potential mediator. These 
results indicated that participants’ beliefs about the strength of the evidence predicted 
participants’ impressions of the suspect, F(1, 110) = 87.68, p < .001, B = -.69 and their 
beliefs about the suspect murdering the victim, F(1, 106) = 54.65, p < .001, B = .93. In the 
final step the dependent variables were regressed on the independent variable and the 
potential mediator. A shown in Table 11, the results from these analyses indicated that the 
effect of condition on participants impressions of the suspect remained significant with the 
inclusion participants’ beliefs about the strength of the evidence, B = -.12, p = .029 and the 
effect of condition on participants beliefs about the suspect murdering the victim became 
non-significant with the inclusion participants’ beliefs about the strength of the evidence, B = 
.12, p = .238. 
Overall, the results of these analyses indicate that participants had a tendency to 
interpret information as being consistent with their expectation. There was also evidence to 
suggest that this interpretative tendency contributed to the accumulation of perceptual bias 
effects. 
Remembering. I performed one set of analyses to examine the hypothesis that 
participants would inaccurately remember information in a manner consistent with their 
expectation. A 2 (Expectation: weak versus strong) x 2 (Social influence: no social influence 
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versus social influence) ANOVA was conducted in which participants’ scores on the index of 
bias served as the dependent variable. Scores on this index could range from -5 to +5. More 
negative scores indicated participants misremembered information suggesting the suspect 
was not guilty, more positive scores indicated participants misremembered information 
suggesting the suspect was guilty, and scores close to zero indicated greater memory 
accuracy.  
As shown in Table 12, results revealed neither a main effect of expectation, F (1, 101) 
= 2.36, p = .128, η2 = .02, nor a main effect of social influence, F (1, 101) = .62, p = .433, η2 
= .01. However, there was a significant interaction between expectation and social influence, 
F (1, 101) = 14.83, p = .008, η2 = .07. Even though there was not a main effect of 
expectation, contrasts and regression analyses were performed to examine the interaction 
pattern. 
The results of two contrasts partially supported the hypothesis that biased assimilation 
process related to memory contributed to the accumulation effect. Contrasts indicated that: 
(1) participants in the weak-similar social influence condition did not have significant larger 
scores on the index of bias (M = -.33) than those in the weak-no social influence condition 
(M = .22), t (101) = 1.38, p = .171, d = .38 and (2) participants in the strong-similar social 
influence condition had larger scores on the index of bias (M = .89) than participants in the 
strong-no social influence condition, (M = -.12), t (101) = 2.42, p = .017, d = .71.  
Results of the regression analyses suggested that memory was not mediating the 
accumulation effect. In the first step I regressed the dependent variables on the independent 
variable. These results are identical to those yielded earlier which indicated that condition 
predicted participants’ impressions of the suspect, F(1, 110) = 22.54, p = .001, B = -.29, and 
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participants’ beliefs about the suspect murdering the victim, F(1, 106) = 12.88, p = .001, B = 
.37. In the second step I regressed the potential mediator on the independent variable. Results 
showed that condition predicted participants’ scores on the index of bias, F(1, 103) = 3.99, p 
= .048, B = .28. In the third step the dependent variables were regressed on the potential 
mediator. These results indicated that participants’ scores on the index of bias predicted 
participants’ impressions of the suspect, F(1, 103) = 10.04, p = .002, B = -.15 and their 
beliefs about the suspect murdering the victim, F(1, 103) = 12.91, p = .001, B = .26. In the 
final step the dependent variables were regressed on the independent variable and the 
potential mediator. A shown in Table 11, the results from these analyses indicated that the 
effect of condition on participants impressions of the suspect, B = -.29, p < .001, and on their 
beliefs about the suspect murdering the victim, B = .30, p = .003, remained significant with 
the inclusion of participants’ scores on the index of bias. 
These analyses show that, across conditions, most participants’ scores were close to 
zero. This suggests that participants’ memories about the case were largely accurate because 
they correctly identified the facts of the case. Although the scores on the index of bias 
indicated that those in the strong-similar were the most inaccurate and that these participants 
were inaccurate in the direction of their expectation, regression analyses did not suggest that 
this process contributed to the accumulation of perceptual bias effects observed in these data. 
 Certainty. Two sets of analyses were conducted regarding certainty. The first 
examined the hypothesis that participants’ would be more confident in their beliefs about the 
suspect’s guilt when socially influenced than when not socially influenced. These analyses 
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focused on participants’ confidence in their assessment of the suspect’s guilt and their 
confidence that suspect was the true culprit. 
First, a 2 (Expectation: weak versus strong) x 2 (Social influence: no social influence 
versus social influence) ANOVA was conducted in which participants’ confidence in their 
assessment of the suspect’s guilt served as the dependent variable. As shown in Table 14, 
results indicated that neither the main effects nor an interaction between expectation and 
social influence were significant, Fs (1, 108) < 1.28, ps > .260, η2s < .01. 
Second, a 2 (Expectation: weak versus strong) x 2 (Social influence: no social 
influence versus social influence) ANOVA was conducted in which participants’ confidence 
that the suspect was the culprit served as the dependent variable. As shown in Table 14, 
results indicated that participants were more confident that the suspect was the culprit when 
given a strong expectation (M = 3.74) than when given a weak expectation (M = 3.16), F (1, 
104) = 7.50, p = .007, η2 = .07. There was no main effect of social influence, F (1, 104) = 
.45, p = .502, η2 < .01, nor an interaction between expectation and social influence, F (1, 
104) = 3.03, p = .085, η2 = .03. However, means were in the expected direction (Ms = 
3.05weak-similar social influence, 3.27 weak-no social influence, 3.49 strong-no social influence, 4.00 strong-similar social 
influence). Thus, results indicate that social influence manipulation did not influence 
participants’ reported confidence. 
Perceived consensus. Two sets of analyses were conducted to examine the hypothesis 
that perceived consensus would moderate the relationship between expectation and social 
influence on participants’ evaluations of the suspect’s guilt. In order to examine this 
hypothesis, participants in the dissimilar social influence conditions are included in the 
66 
 
 
following analyses. These analyses focused on participants’ impressions of the suspect and 
participants’ beliefs about the suspect murdering the victim. 
  First, a 2 (Expectation: weak versus strong) x 3 (Social influence: no social influence 
versus dissimilar-social influence versus similar-social influence) ANOVA was conducted in 
which participants’ impressions of the suspect served as the dependent variable. As shown in 
Table 15, results revealed a significant main effect of expectation, F (1, 134) = 13.95, p < 
.001, η2 = .09. Participants given a weak expectation had more positive impressions of the 
suspect (M = 3.77) than participants given a strong expectation (M = 3.33). There was no 
main effect of social influence, F (2, 134) = .27, p = .767. However, there was a significant 
interaction between expectation and social influence, F (2, 134) = 4.10, p = .019.  
Figure 8 presents participants’ mean impressions of the suspect by expectation and 
social influence. This figure shows that (1) participants in the weak-no social influence 
condition did not have more positive impressions of the suspect (M = 3.68) compared to 
those in the strong-no social influence condition (M = 3.44), t (67) = 1.46, p = .148, d = .35, 
(2) participants in the weak-dissimilar social influence condition did not have more positive 
impressions of the suspect (M = 3.58) compared to those in the strong-dissimilar social 
influence condition (M = 3.3.40), t (26) = .80, p = .430, d = .30, and (3) participants in the 
weak-similar social influence condition had more positive impressions of the suspect (M = 
4.06) compared to those in the strong-no social influence condition (M = 3.15), t (41) = 4.57, 
p < .001, d = 1.40. 
 Second, a 2 (Expectation: weak versus strong) x 3 (Social influence: no social 
influence versus dissimilar-social influence versus similar-social influence) ANOVA was 
conducted in which participants’ beliefs about the suspect murdering the victim served as the 
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dependent variable. As shown in Table 12, results revealed neither a significant main effect 
of expectation, F (1, 131) = 1.04, p = .310, η2 = .01, nor a significant main effect of social 
influence, F (2, 131) = .44, p = .648. However, there was a significant interaction between 
expectation and social influence, F (2, 131) = 8.42, p < .001.  
Figure 9 presents participants’ beliefs about the suspect murdering the victim by 
expectation and social influence. This figure shows that (1) participants in the strong no-
social influence condition were not more likely to believe the suspect murdered the victim (M 
= 3.46) compared to those in the weak-no social influence condition (M = 3.42), t (66) = 
.124, p = .902, d = .04, and (2) participants in the strong-dissimilar social influence condition 
were not more likely to believe the suspect murdered the victim (M = 2.88) compared to 
those in the weak-no social influence condition (M = 3.62), t (27) = 1.91, p = .066, d = .72; 
however, (3) participants in the strong-dissimilar social influence condition were more likely 
to believe the suspect murdered the victim (M = 4.11) compared to those in the weak-no 
social influence condition (M = 2.82), t (38) = 4.12, p < .001, d = 1.31. 
A follow-up analysis was conducted to explore differences between those with 
perceived similarity and dissimilarity with a purported other’s beliefs. A 2 (Expectation: 
weak versus strong) x 2 (Perceived similarity: similar versus dissimilar) ANOVA was 
conducted among participants in the social influence conditions. Participants’ agreement with 
the following statement served as the dependent variable “The other participant made a 
convincing argument.” Results revealed a main effect of perceived similarity, F (1, 61) = 
7.78, p = .007, η2 = .11. Participants with similar opinions believed the bogus participant’s 
statement was more convincing (M = 3.64) than those with dissimilar opinions (M = 2.83). 
Results indicated neither a significant main effect of expectation, F (1, 61) = 2.39, p = .127, 
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η
2 = .03, nor an interaction between similarity and expectation, F (1, 61) = 1.47, p = .230, η2 
= .02. Consistent with a bias assimilation process, these findings suggest that perceived 
consensus can also influence the interpretation of information. 
Results strongly suggest that perceived consensus was contributing to the 
accumulation pattern. That is, accumulation patterns were observed only among those 
participants that perceived their beliefs as being similar to the bogus participant’s. In 
addition, perceived consensus influenced participants’ ratings of how convincing they 
believed the bogus participant’s statement was. 
Discussion 
 The primary goals of Experiment 1 were to (1) determine if perceptual bias effects 
accumulate across perceivers in a situation in which explicit information about another’s 
impressions of a target is learned prior to developing one’s strategies for interacting with a 
target, and (2) examine whether biased assimilation and consensus processes would 
contribute to any observed accumulation effect. These goals were addressed by conducting 
an experiment that manipulated participants’ expectations about a suspect’s guilt and whether 
or not they were exposed to another perceiver’s beliefs about the suspect. The opportunity for 
accumulation was only possible for perceivers who were exposed to another perceiver’s 
beliefs. Results indicated that cumulative perceptual bias effects occurred only when 
perceived consensus was taken into consideration and that several of the proposed processes 
were operating. In the following sections, I elaborate on the findings observed in this 
experiment. 
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Accumulation of Perceptual Bias Effects 
This research examined the hypothesis that perceptual bias effects can accumulate 
across perceivers such that the combined effect of multiple perceivers is larger than the effect 
of any individual perceiver. Results obtained using the full sample did not indicate that 
accumulation was occurring. On a theoretical level, the potential for perceptual bias effects to 
accumulate across perceivers only exists when perceivers share similar beliefs about the 
target. Thus, the data were reanalyzed using a partial sample of participants who identified 
themselves as having similar beliefs about the suspect’s guilt. Analyses based on these 
participants were  consistent with an accumulation hypothesis. Participants who perceived 
their own beliefs about a suspect’s guilt as being similar to the beliefs of another person 
developed more extreme impressions about the suspect than participants who were not 
exposed to another’s beliefs. For example, participants who had a weak expectation about the 
suspect’s guilt and received information that another participant believed the suspect was not 
guilty had more positive impressions of the suspect and were less likely to believe the 
suspect was guilty than participants who had a weak expectation about the suspect’s guilt, 
but did not receive any information about another participant’s beliefs. Similarly, participants 
who had strong expectations about the suspect’s guilt and received information that another 
participant believed the suspect was guilty had more negative impressions of the suspect and 
were more likely to believe the suspect was guilty than participants who had a strong 
expectation about the suspect’s guilt, but did not received any information about another 
participant’s beliefs.  
These results suggest that perceptual biases can accumulate in situations that are 
characterized by limited contact between perceivers and no contact between perceiver and 
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target. Participants received information about a purported other’s beliefs through a written 
statement. Interestingly, neither of the two statements made reference to any specific 
evidence indicating why the person believed the suspect was not guilty versus guilty. The 
only difference between the two statements was the belief of the suspect’s guilt. However, 
for those participants who perceived similarity in the beliefs specified in the statement, it was 
enough to substantially alter their perceptions of the suspect. For example, among 
participants given no information about another’s beliefs, 66% of participants given a weak 
expectation and 70% of participants given a strong expectation believed the suspect was 
guilty. However, when participants perceived similarity with another’s beliefs those 
percentages changed, such that now 33% of the participants given a weak expectation and 
83% of participants given a strong expectation believed the suspect was guilty. These 
findings suggest that perceptual bias effects were accumulating.  
Mechanisms Underlying the Accumulation of Perceptual Bias Effects 
 Previous research has indicated that people engage in biased assimilation processes 
including the tendency to seek, interpret, and remember information consistently with their 
expectations (e.g., Olson et al., 1996; Nickerson, 1998). I hypothesized that these tendencies 
would occur to a greater extent when participants had similar expectations. Results provided 
support for the tendency to interpret and remember information in a manner consistent with 
one’s expectation, but did not for the tendency to seek information in a manner consistent 
with one’s expectation. In addition, I hypothesized that perceived consensus would 
contribute to the accumulation of perceptual bias effects through changes in participants’ 
confidence. Results yielded no support for the idea that perceived consensus increases 
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confidence, but did suggest that perceived consensus does contribute to accumulation effects. 
In the following sections, I elaborate on these findings. 
Seeking. Overall, results from this experiment suggested that participants did not 
preferentially seek information consistent with their expectations. Participants were given a 
list of accusatory and non-accusatory techniques and asked to select those they would use if 
given a chance to interview/interrogate the suspect. There were no differences in the type of 
techniques participants’ selected based on their expectation or whether they perceived 
similarity with the purported other’s statement. Participants were also given a list of 
accusatory and non-accusatory questions and statements and asked to make selections. 
Although participants given a strong expectation selected more accusatory questions and 
statements than those given a weak expectation, this effect was not stronger among those 
perceiving similarity with the purported other’s statement. Thus, this process does not 
account for the accumulation effect observed in these data. 
Interpreting. Results, did, however, provide some support for the hypothesis that 
people interpret information consistently with their expectations and that this tendency 
contributed to cumulative perceptual bias effects. Participants were given a fabricated 
summary of an interview/interrogation with the suspect. This summary included vague 
information about the suspect and descriptions of ambiguous behaviors demonstrated by the 
suspect. Participants indicated their impressions of the suspect, their beliefs about the 
suspect’s truthfulness, and their beliefs about the strength of the evidence. Results indicated 
that there were no differences in participants’ impressions of the suspect’s behavior described 
in the summary based on condition. However, consistent with the idea that interpretational 
biases contribute to perceptual bias effects, participants given a strong expectation believed 
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the suspect was being less truthful and that the strength of the evidence was stronger than 
participants given a weak expectation. Furthermore, in regards to the question of truthfulness, 
this tendency was demonstrated more in those who perceived similarity with the purported 
other’s statement. Therefore, these results suggest that interpretation of information could 
have been contributing to the accumulation pattern observed to some extent.  
Remembering. Results indicated that there was some evidence to indicate that the 
tendency for people to remember information consistently with their expectation played a 
role in the accumulation of perceptual bias effects. Participants were given a list of 
statements that contained accurate and inaccurate facts of the case. Participants were asked to 
indicate whether each statement was false, true, or if they were unsure. Results showed that 
participants were generally accurate in their responses. However, results also indicated that 
those participants who were given a strong expectation and who perceived similarity with a 
purported other’s beliefs misremembered the most information. Furthermore, they 
misremembered information in a direction that was consistent with their expectation. 
However, regression analyses testing for mediation did not suggest that memory was 
significantly contributing to the accumulation effect observed.  
Consensus. Overall, results were consistent with the proposition that perceived 
consensus was contributing to the accumulation of perceptual bias effects. I examined 
whether participants’ perceptions regarding the similarity between their own beliefs and the 
purported other’s beliefs would influence their confidence, their impressions, and their 
beliefs about the suspect’s guilt. 
First, I hypothesized that participants who believed that their own beliefs about the 
suspect’s guilt were similar to another’s beliefs would be more confident in their assessment 
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of the case and in their beliefs about the suspect being the true culprit relative to participants 
who did not receive information about another person’s beliefs. There was no evidence to 
support this hypothesis in regards to participants’ confidence in their assessment of the case. 
However, results indicated that participants who perceived similarity between their beliefs 
and those of a purported other were somewhat, but not significantly, more confident the 
suspect was the culprit than participants who were given no information about other’s beliefs. 
Second, I hypothesized that perceived consensus would moderate the relationship 
between expectation and social influence on participants’ impressions of the suspect and of 
the suspect’s guilt. Results were consistent with that proposition. Accumulation findings 
were only observed among participants who indicated that they perceived similarity with the 
purported other’s beliefs. When participants perceived dissimilarity in their beliefs, no 
accumulation was observed. These results strongly suggest that perceived consensus was an 
important determinant in the accumulation process. Additionally, a follow-up analysis 
revealed that participants who perceived similarity rated the arguments by the purported 
other as being more convincing than those who perceived dissimilarity. This finding 
indicates that perceived consensus may lead to the occurrence of biased assimilation 
processes. 
Exploring Perceptions of Similarity 
As previously stated, accumulation of perceptual bias effects only occurred after 
identifying a subset of participants who believed they had similar beliefs to another person. 
Conceptually, focusing on this subset this makes sense because perceivers must perceive 
similarity in order for accumulation to occur. However, because in this research participants 
self-selected themselves into these new categories (i.e., perceived similarity or perceived 
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dissimilarity) it is possible that some other variable could be responsible for differences 
observed between the conditions.  
One possibility is that participants who perceived similarity in the social influence 
conditions may have held stronger beliefs than those who perceived dissimilarity in the social 
influence conditions. If this happened, then the participants who perceived similarity simply 
held more extreme beliefs at the outset than those who perceived dissimilarity. To examine 
this possibility, I identified participants in the no social influence conditions who were more 
confident in the their assessment of the suspect’s guilt and then compared their perceptions of 
the suspect to those in the similar-social influence conditions. By identifying these 
participants, the comparison between the two groups is more equivalent at least in terms of 
the strength of their beliefs. 
Results indicated that there was not a significant difference between confident weak-
no social influence participants’ impressions of the suspect (M = 3.64) and their beliefs about 
the suspect murdering the victim (M = 3.83) compared to participants in the weak-similar 
social influence condition (Ms = 3.89, 3.11), t (47) = 1.16, p = .251; t (45) = 1.91, p = .063. A 
similar pattern was found among those given a weak expectation. There was not a significant 
difference between confident strong-no social influence participants’ impressions of the 
suspect (M = 3.24) and their beliefs about the suspect murdering the victim (M = 3.83) 
compared to participants in the strong-similar social influence condition (Ms = 3.26, 3.53), t 
(44) = .10, p = .920; t (44) = .79, p = .435. These results do not support the proposition that 
participants were self-selecting themselves into the similar-social influence conditions on the 
basis of their confidence.  
75 
 
 
Although the experiment was designed so that participants would be exposed to 
beliefs from another person that was similar to their own, as mentioned early, not all 
participants perceived similarity. Approximately 40% of the participants that received the 
bogus participant’s statement did not perceive similarity in beliefs. The fact that perceived 
dissimilarity occurred fairly equally among the weak and strong expectation conditions 
suggests that it was probably not something about the case that was causing differences in 
perceived similarity, but rather something about participants’ previous experiences or 
personality factors. Therefore, I drew on additional questions within the dataset to examine 
whether any other variables could explain why some participants perceived similarity and 
others did not.  
These exploratory analyses only revealed one significant effect. An independent t-test 
indicated that male participants were more likely to perceive similarity with the bogus 
participant’s statement (M = 3.97) than females (M = 3.08), t (63) = 2.54, p = .014.Therefore,  
I conducted a follow-up ANOVA to determine if gender was interacting with either 
expectation or social influence or both to influence participants’ impressions or their beliefs 
about the suspect murdering the victim. Results indicated no main effect of gender, nor any 
interaction effects with gender, (see Table 16 for statistical information), thereby suggesting 
that any effect of gender was occurring equally across conditions. 
A third possibility is that participants in the similar social influence conditions may 
have been more susceptible to the social influence manipulation than participants in the 
dissimilar social influence conditions. Perhaps only those who were more easily influenced 
perceived similarity and that this susceptibility was moderating the accumulation effect. 
Although results did indicate that those who perceived similarity believed the written 
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statement contained more convincing arguments than those who perceived dissimilarity, no 
data on susceptibility was specifically collected in this experiment. Additional research 
should examine whether some perceivers are more susceptible to the influence of other’s 
beliefs making it more likely for perceptual bias effects to accumulate across people. 
This research indicated that perceived consensus was an important factor in 
participants’ judgments. Future research should further explore the role that perceived 
consensus plays in the accumulation of perceptual bias effects, the relationship between 
perceived consensus and susceptibility to being socially influenced, and the development of 
perceived consensus.  
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Chapter 9: Experiment 2: Accumulation through Social Interaction 
Overview 
This experiment had two objectives. Its first objective was to determine if perceptual 
bias effects accumulate across perceivers in a situation in which perceivers discuss their 
strategies for interacting with the target (see Figure 3). In Experiment 1, a statement 
explicitly communicated a bogus participant’s impressions of the target before perceivers 
selected strategies for interacting with the target. In contrast, some perceivers in this 
experiment were allowed to communicate with each other while they selected strategies for 
interacting with a hypothetical target. Thus, this experiment differs from the first in terms of 
how impressions were communicated (i.e., explicit statement from bogus participant versus 
face-to-face interaction with real participant) and when the impressions were communicated 
(i.e., before or during the selection of strategies). This experiment is more similar to the 
previous investigation of cumulative perceptual bias effects than Experiment 1 because 
perceivers have an opportunity to interact with one another (Willard et al., 2008). However, 
this experiment also differs from that investigation by allowing perceivers to select strategies 
together and by preventing them from interacting with a target.  
 Its second objective was to examine the extent to which biased assimilation processes 
and consensus contributed to any observed accumulation effects. Because this experiment 
was designed to be somewhat similar to the previous investigation of accumulation (Willard 
et al., 2008), any evidence that these processes contributed to cumulative perceptual bias 
effects may more readily answer questions raised in that investigation.  
To address these objectives, I manipulated participants’ expectations about a 
suspect’s guilt and social influence. Participants’ expectations were manipulated using the 
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same procedures as those in Experiment 1. Participants either received either a weak case 
which suggested that there was an alternative suspect who may have committed the crime, or 
a strong case which suggested that the suspect had a motive for committing the crime. Social 
influence, by contrast, was manipulated in a manner that differed from the manner in which it 
was manipulated in Experiment 1. Here, rather than manipulating social influence with a 
statement ostensibly written by another participant, social influence was manipulated via real 
social interaction between two actual participants who were induced with either similar or 
dissimilar expectations about the suspect’s guilt. When participants were induced with 
similar expectations, both received either the weak case or the strong case. When participants 
were induced with dissimilar expectations, one received the weak case and the other received 
the strong case. Experiment 2 also included two control conditions in which participants, 
working alone, received either the weak or strong case. All participants selected strategies for 
hypothetically interviewing/interrogating the suspect. However, whereas participants in the 
social influence conditions worked in pairs to select their strategies, participants in the two 
control conditions worked alone.  
Consistent with an accumulation process, I hypothesized that participants who 
worked in pairs and who had been induced with similar expectations would have beliefs and 
impressions that were more in line with their expectations than participants who worked in 
pairs but who had been induced with dissimilar expectations and  participants who worked 
alone. Furthermore, it was hypothesized that participants who worked in pairs and who had 
been induced with similar expectations would engage in more biased assimilation processes 
than pairs who had been induced with dissimilar expectations and participants who worked 
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alone. Lastly, factors related to consensus were expected to contribute to accumulation 
findings. 
Methods 
Participants 
Two-hundred and eleven participants were recruited from the Psychology 
Department’s Research Participation Pool at Iowa State University. The sample included 102 
males and 109 females. The mean age of participants was 20 and approximately 88% of the 
sample identified themselves as Caucasian. In exchange for their participation, students 
earned credit in their psychology courses.  
Design 
 The design of this study was atypical because the independent variables were not 
fully crossed. In this experiment, participants’ expectations (i.e., weak versus strong), the 
level of social influence received (i.e., no social influence versus social influence), and the 
similarity of participants’ expectations within the social influence conditions were 
manipulated (i.e., similar versus dissimilar). Thus, participants were assigned to 1 of the 
following 5 conditions: weak-no social influence (n = 23), strong-no social influence (n = 
26), weak-social influence (n = 24pairs), mixed-social influence (n = 24pairs), and strong-social 
influence (n = 25pairs). 
All participants were assigned to receive either a weak or a strong expectation about 
the suspect’s guilt and were assigned to receive no social influence or a social influence. In 
the no social influence conditions, individual participants were randomly assigned to one of 
two expectation conditions: weak or strong. The condition in which participants received a 
weak expectation and no social influence is subsequently referred to as the weak-no social 
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influence condition. The condition in which participants received a strong expectation and no 
social influence is subsequently referred to as the strong-no social influence condition. As 
noted previously, these two conditions served as control conditions. 
In the social influence conditions, pairs of participants were randomly assigned to one 
of three expectation-similarity conditions: weak-social influence, mixed-social influence, and 
strong-social influence. In the weak-social influence condition, both participants received 
weak expectations. In the mixed-social influence condition, one participant received a weak 
expectation whereas the other received a strong expectation. In the strong-social influence 
condition, both participants received strong expectations. Thus, in the social influence 
conditions both participants’ expectations about the suspect (i.e., weak versus strong) and the 
similarity of their expectations (i.e., similar versus dissimilar) were manipulated. 
Materials 
 Manipulating expectations. The case information discussed in Preliminary Study 1 
and in Experiment 1 was used to manipulate participants’ expectations in this experiment 
(Appendix A). Participants in the weak expectation conditions received a case that suggested 
that there was an alternative suspect in the case, whereas participants in the strong 
expectation conditions received a case that indicated the suspect had a motive for committing 
the crime.  
 Interrogation summary. The same interview/interrogation summary with the suspect 
used in Experiment 1 was provided in order to examine whether participants would engage 
the biased assimilation process of interpreting ambiguous information in a manner consistent 
with one’s expectation (Appendix J). 
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Participants’ Impressions and Mechanisms Related to Accumulation  
Several items were used as manipulation checks to measure participants’ impressions 
of the suspect and the suspect’s guilt, and to measure biased assimilation and consensus 
processes. Except where noted, participants’ responses were averaged across pairs in the 
social influence conditions.  
 Manipulation check. All of the manipulation check items were assessed before 
participants in the social influence condition worked in pairs; thus, participants completed 
these items independently and participants’ responses were not averaged across pairs in the 
social influence conditions. Two items assessed participants’ recognition of key information 
that distinguished the weak from the strong case. Participants were given two statements, 
“Eva had a motive for the crime” and “The victim received phone calls in which a man 
threatened her” (Appendix K). Participants responded to these statements by selecting true, 
unsure, or false. 
 Two items measured whether the two cases influenced participants’ expectations of 
the suspect’s likelihood of lying and their opinions about the plausibility of the suspect’s 
story (Appendix F). Participants rated their agreement with the following two statements 
“During an interview with Eva, I would expect her to lie.” and “I think that Eva’s account of 
the event is plausible.” on a six point scale with anchors 1 (strongly disagree) and 6 (strongly 
agree).  
Nine items measured participants’ impressions of the suspect (Appendix F). 
Participants rated the extent to which they believed the suspect was intelligent, honest, moral, 
upset, truthful, calculating, unstable, warm, and a typical criminal. Participants rated their 
agreement with these adjectives describing the suspect on a six point scale with anchors 1 
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(strongly disagree) and 6 (strongly agree). An impression of the suspect was created by 
averaging the following six items: intelligent, honest, moral, truthful, warm, and typical 
criminal, the latter of which was reverse coded. High scores indicated a more positive 
impression of the suspect, α = .81.  
Participants’ beliefs about the suspect’s guilt. Participants’ beliefs about the suspect’s 
guilt were measured with two items (Appendix K). First, participants rated their agreement 
with the statement “Eva murdered the victim.” on a six point scale with anchors 1 (strongly 
disagree) and 6 (strongly agree). Second, participants circled either not guilty or guilty in 
response to the item “I believe Eva is...”.  
 Participants’ selection strategies. The four measures were used to assess the extent to 
which participants sought information consistent with their expectations. These were 
identical to those presented in Experiment 1 (Appendix H). First, participants were given 16 
interview/interrogation techniques and selected five that they would use during an 
interrogation with the suspect. Higher scores indicated that a greater number of accusatory 
techniques were selected. 
 Second, participants were given 22 interview/interrogation questions and statements 
(see Table 2 or Appendix I) and selected eight that they would use during an interrogation 
with the suspect. High scores indicated that a greater number of accusatory questions or 
statements were selected.  
 The third measure consisted of the same 22 interview/interrogation questions and 
statements. Two variables were created that indicated the average aggressiveness or guilt-
presumptiveness of questions and statements selected by participants. Scores could range 
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from one to four with higher scores indicating that participants selected questions or 
statements with a greater degree of aggressiveness or guilt-presumptiveness.  
The fourth set of measures included two items that assessed participants’ goals and 
how much effort they exerted when selecting the techniques: “I selected techniques with the 
primary goal of getting the suspect to confess” and “I put a lot of thought into the 
interview/interrogation strategies that I selected.” Participants rated their agreement with 
these statements on a six point scale with anchors 1 (strongly disagree) and 6 (strongly 
agree). 
Participants’ interpretations. Four sets of items assessed the extent to which 
participants interpreted the case and the suspects’ behavior as described in the 
interview/interrogation summary as being consistent with their expectations (Appendix K). 
One set reflected an interpretation of the suspect’s behavior during the 
interview/interrogation (i.e., the summary). This was assessed with five items embedded 
among four other items. Participants rated the extent to which they believed the suspect was 
defensive, honest, friendly, truthful, and warm during the interview/interrogation on a six 
point scale with anchors 1 (strongly disagree) and 6 (strongly agree). Participants’ responses 
were reverse coded as necessary and the five items were averaged. High scores indicated a 
more positive interpretation of the suspect’s behavior,  α = .71. 
The second set of items measured participants’ beliefs about the truthfulness of the 
suspect: “Based on Eva’s behavior as described in the summary, I think she is telling the 
truth.” and “Eva’s denials were very convincing.” Participants indicated their agreement with 
these items on a six point scale with anchors 1 (strongly disagree) and 6 (strongly agree). 
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Participants’ responses to these two items were averaged, r = .65, p < .001. High scores 
indicated greater belief in the suspect’s truthfulness. 
The third set of items measured participants’ perceptions of the strength of the 
evidence: a) “It is likely at this point that I would continue investigating the crime in order to 
look for alternative suspects.”; b) “I believe there is enough evidence to arrest Eva for 
committing the crime.”; and c) “The evidence against Eva is very persuasive.” Participants 
indicated their agreement with these items on a six point scale with anchors 1 (strongly 
disagree) and 6 (strongly agree). Responses to the first item were reversed coded and then 
responses to the three items were averaged. Higher scores indicate stronger beliefs about the 
strength of the evidence against the suspect, α = .57. 
The fourth item measured participants’ perceptions about the consistency between 
their expectations and the behavior displayed by the suspect in the interview/interrogation 
summary. Participants rated their agreement with the statement “Eva behaved as I expected 
during the interview/interrogation (i.e., summary).” on a six point scale with anchors 1 
(strongly disagree) and 6 (strongly agree). 
Participants’ memory. A list of 11 statements measured bias in participants’ memory 
(Appendix K). Identical to the procedures described in Experiment 1, seven of the items were 
used to create an index of bias that ranged from -5 to +5. Negative scores indicated a bias to 
misremember information that suggested the suspect was not guilty, positive scores indicated 
a bias to misremember information that suggested the suspect was guilty, and scores closer to 
zero indicated a more accurate memory.   
Certainty. Two items measured participants’ certainty through confidence (Appendix 
K). Identical to the measures presented in Experiment 1, participants’ confidence was 
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assessed with the following two items: “I am confident in my assessment of Eva’s guilt” and 
“I am confident that Eva is the true culprit in this crime.” Participants indicated their 
agreement with these items on a six point scale with anchors 1 (strongly disagree) and 6 
(strongly agree). 
Perceived consensus. Perceived consensus was measured only in the social influence 
conditions (Appendix K). One question assessed the degree to which participants perceived 
that their partner held a similar expectation about the suspect as they themselves did, referred 
to as perceived consensus. Participants answered the following question: “The other 
participant and I have similar opinions about the case.” Participants also answered another 
other item related to consensus but used for exploratory purposes: “The other participant 
made a convincing argument.” Participants indicated their agreement with these items on a 
six point scale with anchors 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree).  
Procedures 
 Participants were first assigned to the no social influence or the social influence 
condition based on the number of people that showed up for a given session. If three 
participants showed up, then two of the participants were randomly assigned to participate as 
a pair (social influence conditions) and the other as an individual (no social influence 
conditions). If two participants showed up, then both were assigned to participate as a pair 
(social influence conditions). If only one participant showed up, then he or she was assigned 
to work alone (no social influence conditions). 
After consenting to participate, participants were told that they would be evaluating a 
real criminal case from the perspective of an investigator. Participants’ expectations about 
the suspect’s guilt were manipulated by having them to read either the weak or strong 
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versions of the case (Appendix A). The cases were provided to participants in folders and 
thus, experimenters were blind to expectation condition until the completion of the study. 
Participants read their cases independently and then completed a questionnaire that asked 
about their initial impressions of the suspect (Appendix F).  
Next, participants received the list of interview/interrogation techniques and the list of 
interview/interrogation questions and statements (Appendices H and I). All participants were 
instructed to select five techniques and eight questions and statements they would use if 
given the opportunity to talk to the suspect. Participants were instructed to select techniques, 
questions, and statements that would help them uncover the truth and, if they believed the 
suspect was guilty, to get the suspect to confess. Participants in the no social influence 
conditions did this task alone. In contrast, participants in the social influence conditions made 
their selections together in private. After making their selections, participants were instructed 
to complete the rest of the experiment independently. Specifically, following the same 
procedures used in Experiment 1, participants were given the interview/interrogation 
summary and questionnaires that assessed the following: their impressions of the suspect’s 
guilt, interpretation of information, memory of evidence, certainty, consensus (Appendix K), 
demographic information (Appendix C), and suspicion (Appendix D). Finally, participants 
were debriefed and thanked for their participation. 
Results 
Preliminary Analyses 
 Expectation manipulation. Two sets of analyses were conducted to determine if the 
weak and strong cases influenced participants’ expectations about the suspect’s guilt in the 
manner intended. First, two frequency analyses were conducted to examine whether 
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participants were aware of the key information that served to manipulate their expectations. 
Participants who received the weak case were exposed to information stating that the victim 
had received threatening phone calls from another person, thereby suggesting that there was 
an alternative suspect in the case. If participants who received the weak case indicated that 
this was a false statement, then their response was incorrect (n = 4). Participants who 
received the strong case were exposed to information stating the victim had a motive for 
committing the crime. If participants who received the strong case indicated that this was a 
false statement, then their response was incorrect (n = 4). Eight participants responded 
incorrectly to one of these items. All eight of these participants were in a social influence 
condition and from different pairs. These eight pairs were excluded from all subsequent 
analyses: two pairs from the weak-social influence condition, four pairs from the mixed-
social influence condition, and two pairs from the strong-social influence condition. Thus, 
the final data sample included the following: 23 participants in the weak-no social influence 
condition, 26 participants in the strong-no social influence condition, 24 pairs in the weak-
social influence condition, 24 pairs in the mixed-social influence condition, and 25 pairs in 
the strong-social influence condition. The final sample breakdown, including gender 
information, is presented in Table 17. 
Second, three analyses were conducted to examine whether the two cases induced 
different expectations about the suspect. I hypothesized that participants who received a 
strong expectation would be less likely to believe the suspect’s story was plausible, would be 
more likely to believe the suspect is lying, and would have less positive impressions about 
the suspect compared to participants who received a weak expectation. Additionally, I 
hypothesized, that because these measures were taken before participants in the social 
88 
 
 
influence conditions worked as pairs, there would be no difference between participants’ 
responses based on social influence. 
First, a 2 (Expectation: weak versus strong) x 2 (Social influence: no social influence 
versus social influence) ANOVA was conducted in which participants’ ratings of the 
plausibility of the suspect’s story served as the dependent variable. As shown in Table 18, 
participants given the strong expectation believed the suspect’s story was less plausible (M = 
3.04) than those given the weak expectation (M = 3.59), F (1, 199) = 9.77, p = .002, η2 = .04. 
There was neither a main effect of social influence, F (1, 199) = 2.10, p = .149, η2 < .01, nor 
an interaction between expectation and social influence, F (1, 199) = .54, p = .484, η2 < .01. 
Second, a 2 (Expectation: weak versus strong) x 2 (Social influence: no social 
influence versus social influence) ANOVA was conducted in which participants’ 
expectations about the suspect lying during an interview/interrogation served as the 
dependent variable. As shown in Table 18, participants given the strong expectation were 
more likely to expect the suspect to lie (M = 4.26) than those given the weak expectation (M 
= 3.83), F (1, 199) = 7.06, p = .009, η2 = .03. There was neither a main effect of social 
influence, F (1, 199) = 3.15, p = .08, η2 = 02, nor an interaction between expectation and 
social influence, F (1, 199) = .24, p = .626, η2 < .01. 
Third, a 2 (Expectation: weak versus strong) x 2 (Social influence: no social influence 
versus social influence) ANOVA was conducted in which participants’ impressions of the 
suspect served as the dependent variable. As shown in Table 18, participants given the strong 
expectation had less positive impressions of the suspect (M = 3.22) than those given the weak 
expectation (M = 3.60), F (1, 198) = 10.07, p = .002, η2 = .05. There was neither a main 
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effect of social influence, F (1, 198) = .41, p = .525, η2 <.01, nor an interaction between 
expectation and social influence, F (1, 198) = .70, p = .405, η2 < .01. 
These results indicate that the case influenced participants’ expectations and 
impressions of the suspect’s guilt in the intended manner. Furthermore, these results also 
indicate that expectation influenced participants’ responses equally among those in the no 
social influence and social influence conditions. 
Descriptive information. Correlations, means, and standard deviations for the primary 
measures are presented in Table 19 for participants in the no social influence conditions and 
in Table 20 for pairs of participants in the social influence conditions. 
Primary Analyses 
 Identifying perceived similarity. As specified in Experiment 1, in order for 
accumulation to occur, participants must believe that someone else’s beliefs about a given 
target are similar to their own beliefs about the target. Therefore, using the same procedures 
as outlined in the first experiment, I identified which participants assigned to the social 
influence conditions believed that their beliefs about the suspect’s guilt was similar to their 
partner’s beliefs. In addition, because responses were averaged across participants in the 
social influence conditions, I identified pairs in which both participants believed they had 
dissimilar beliefs, pairs in which one participant believed they had similar and the other 
believed they had dissimilar beliefs, and pairs in which both participants believed they had 
similar beliefs. Table 21, presents the frequencies of pairs in each of the social influence 
conditions fitting these categories. Consistent with the procedures in Experiment 1, I 
conducted analyses excluding pairs in which one or both participants believed they held 
dissimilar beliefs. However, because there were very few participants who perceived their 
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partner to have dissimilar beliefs relative to themselves  (n = 9) and because the pattern of 
results remained the same regardless of whether analyses excluded or included these pairs, no 
participants were excluded from the analysis on this basis. Thus, the subsequent analyses do 
not take into consideration perceived similarity. 
Accumulation of perceptual bias effects. Two sets of analyses were conducted to 
examine the hypothesis that perceptual bias effects accumulate across perceivers. One set 
focused on participants’ beliefs about the suspect murdering the victim and the other set 
focused on participants’ dichotomous ratings of the suspect’s guilt.   
In the first set of analyses, a one-way ANOVA was conducted in which expectations 
among participants in the social influence condition (weak- versus mixed- versus strong-
social influence) served as the independent variable. Participants’ agreement with an item 
stating “Eva murdered the victim” served as the dependent variable. Results would be 
consistent with an accumulation pattern if there was an effect of expectation, such that 
responses of participants in the weak- or strong-social influence conditions were more in line 
with their expectations than participants in the mixed-social influence condition. Results 
indicated a significant difference among the social influence conditions, F (2, 69) = 4.28, p < 
.018. Contrasts revealed that participants in the weak-social influence condition were less 
likely to believe the suspect murdered the victim (M = 3.38) compared to participants in the 
mixed-social influence condition (M = 3.89) and participants in the strong-social influence 
condition (M = 3.92), ts (69) < 2.44, p < .017, ds < .71. This analysis suggests that 
accumulation may be occurring within the weak-social influence condition. Follow-up 
analyses which included the no social influence conditions were conducted to examine this 
interpretation. 
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These follow-up analyses were conducted using procedures similar to those used to 
test for accumulation in Experiment 1. Expectation (i.e., weak versus strong) and social 
influence (i.e., no social influence versus social influence) served as the independent 
variables. In order for accumulation to occur, results should indicate a main effect of 
expectation, such that those in the strong conditions have greater beliefs about the suspect’s 
guilt than those in the weak conditions. Results should also indicate an interaction effect 
between expectation and social influence. These analyses excluded the mixed-social 
influence condition because this condition represents one in which participants were initially 
induced dissimilar expectations. 
A 2 (Expectation: weak versus strong) x 2 (Social influence: no social influence 
versus social influence) ANOVA was conducted to examine participants’ beliefs about 
whether the suspect murdered the victim. The dependent variable is at the group level for the 
social influence conditions (i.e., participants responses averaged across pairs) and at the 
individual level for the no social influence conditions. Results indicated a significant main 
effect of expectation, F (1, 91) = 16.92, p < .001, η2 = .15. Participants given a strong 
expectation were more likely to believe the suspect murdered the victim (M = 4.06) than 
participants given a weak expectation (M = 3.28). However, there was neither a main effect 
of social influence, F (1, 91) = .06, p = .804, η2 < .01, nor an interaction between expectation 
and social influence, F (1, 91) = 1.59, p = .211, η2 = .01. This finding does not support the 
interpretation that accumulation was occurring within the weak-social influence condition. 
Indeed, examination of the means indicates that participants in the weak-social influence 
condition were not less likely to believe the suspect murdered the victim (M = 3.38) than 
participants in the weak-no social influence condition (M = 3.18).  
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In the second set of analyses, I tested the accumulation hypothesis with two chi-
square analyses in which participants’ responses to the dichotomous question pertaining to 
the suspect’s guilt (i.e., not guilty versus not guilty) served as the dependent variable. First, I 
examined the pattern among participants in the social influence conditions. I created a new 
variable that averaged across participants’ ratings of guilt in the social influence conditions. 
This variable indicates guilt and agreement between participants’ responses within pairs. 
Table 22 shows the percentage of participants in each of the social influence conditions in 
which both participants indicated the suspect was not guilty, one participant indicated the 
suspect was not guilty and the other indicated the suspect was guilty, and both participants 
indicated the suspect was guilty. The percentage of pairs in which both participants indicated 
the suspect was guilty was greatest in the strong-social influence condition (71%), slightly 
lower in the mixed-social influence condition (70%), and lowest in the weak-social influence 
condition (38%), χ2 (71) = 10.77, p = .029, ϕ = .39. These results suggest that accumulation 
may be occurring within the weak-social influence condition. Follow-up analyses were 
conducted to examine this interpretation. 
A follow-up second chi-square analysis was conducted among those in the no social 
influence conditions in which expectation served as the independent variable and 
participants’ responses to the question of guilt served as the dependent variable. As shown in 
Table 22, more participants in the strong-no social influence condition indicated the suspect 
was guilty (81%) than those in the weak-no social influence condition (48%), χ2 (49) = 5.85, 
p = .016, ϕ = .35. Examination of the percentages across the two analyses suggests that 
accumulation was not occurring because participants’ responses in the strong-social influence 
conditions were not more extreme that participants responses in the strong-social influence 
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conditions. Although it would be useful to compare participants’ responses between the 
weak-no social and the weak-social influence conditions, because the dependent variable is 
slightly different across the two conditions (i.e., three categories for the social influence 
conditions and only two for the no social influence conditions) the interpretation of such a 
comparison is questionable. 
Overall, the pattern of data across each of the analyses does not suggest that 
perceptual bias effects were accumulating across participants. Although expectations did 
influence participants’ responses, they did not appear to influence responses to a greater 
extent in conditions in which there were two participants versus one.  
Mechanisms underlying the cumulative effects of perceptual biases. The lack of 
cumulative perceptual bias effects suggests that neither biased assimilation nor consensus 
processes should receive support as underlying mechanisms. Analyses were performed to 
confirm that proposition. Analyses focused on the three biased assimilation processes of 
seeking, interpreting, and recalling information consistent with one’s hypothesis. Similar to 
the procedures outlined earlier to test for accumulation, I first examined differences in 
participants’ responses among the social influence conditions. I next examined the effect of 
expectation and social influence by conducting analyses that included the no social influence 
conditions and excluded the mixed-social influence condition. Because there appeared to be 
no evidence indicating that perceptual bias effects were accumulating across perceivers, I did 
not expect to find a significant interaction between expectation and social influence. 
Seeking. Two sets of analyses were conducted to examine whether participants 
preferentially sought information consistent with their expectations. These analyses focused 
on the number of accusatory interview/interrogation techniques selected, the number of 
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accusatory interview/interrogation questions and statements selected, the average item-
aggressiveness of interview/interrogation questions and statements selected, and the average 
item-guilt-presumptiveness of interview/interrogation questions and statements selected by 
participants.  
First, four ANOVAs were conducted in which expectations among participants in the 
social influence condition (weak- versus mixed- versus strong-social influence) served as the 
independent variable. The four variables outlined earlier each served as a dependent variable 
in one of these analyses. As shown in Table 23, results yielded only one significant 
difference in means across conditions. The only significant difference among conditions was 
in the number of accusatory interview/interrogation techniques selected by participants, F (2, 
70) = 5.22, p = .008. Participants in the strong-social influence condition selected a greater 
number of accusatory techniques (M = 3.16) than those in the mixed-social influence 
condition (M = 2.17) and those in the weak-social influence condition (M = 1.71). 
Second, four 2 (Expectation: weak versus strong) x 2 (Social influence: no social 
influence versus social influence) ANOVAs were conducted. Each of the four variables 
outlined earlier served as a dependent variable in one of these analyses. As shown in Table 
24, all results revealed a main effect of expectation, Fs > 10.40, ps < .002, η2 < .10. 
Participants given a strong expectation selected a greater number of accusatory techniques 
(M = 3.06), selected a greater number of accusatory questions and statements (M = 3.60), 
selected items that were more aggressive (M = 2.02), and selected items that were more guilt-
presumptive (M = 2.37) than participants given a weak expectation (Ms = 1.72, 2.54, 1.81, 
2.18, respectively). Results indicated there was neither a significant main effect of social 
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influence, Fs < .07, ps > .791, η2 < .01 , nor an interaction between expectation and social 
influence, Fs < 3.16, ps > .079, η2 < .03. 
These results suggest that participants’ expectations influenced their selection of 
interview/interrogation strategies. However, the tendency to select items consistent with 
one’s expectation did not occur to a greater extent in the social influence conditions in which 
participants held similar expectations.  
Interpreting. I performed two sets of analyses to examine the hypothesis that 
participants would interpret information more consistently with their expectations. These 
analyses focused on participants’ impressions of the suspect based on the behavior described 
in the interview/interrogation summary, participants’ evaluations of the suspect’s 
truthfulness, and participants’ beliefs about the strength of the evidence against the suspect. 
First, three ANOVAs were conducted in which expectations among participants in the 
social influence condition (weak- versus mixed- versus strong-social influence) served as the 
independent variable. Each of the three variables specified above served as a dependent 
variable in one of these analyses. As shown in Table 25, two of the three analyses yielded a 
significant difference across conditions. Participants in the weak-social influence condition 
had more positive impressions of the suspect’s behavior (M = 3.19) than participants in the 
mixed-social influence condition (M = 2.85) and participants in the strong-social influence 
conditions (M = 2.93), F (2, 69) = 5.10, p = .009. In addition, participants in the weak-social 
influence condition believed the suspect was more truthful (M = 3.11) than participants in the 
mixed-social influence condition (M = 2.69) and participants in the strong-social influence 
conditions (M = 2.76), F (2, 70) = 3.66, p = .031. Results did not indicate a significant 
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difference in participants’ perceptions of the strength of the evidence, F (2, 70) = 1.78, p = 
.176. 
Second, three 2 (Expectation: weak versus strong) x 2 (Social influence: no social 
influence versus social influence) ANOVAs were conducted. Each of the three variables 
specified above served as a dependent variable in one of these analyses. As shown in Table 
26, all results revealed a main effect of expectation, Fs > 5.36, ps < .023, η2 < .05. 
Participants given a weak expectation had more positive impressions of the suspect’s 
behavior (M = 3.19), believed the suspect was more truthful (M = 3.13), and rated the 
strength of the evidence against the suspect as lower (M = 2.79) than participants given a 
strong expectation (Ms = 2.87, 2.75, 3.15, respectively). Results indicated there was neither a 
significant main effect of social influence, Fs < .07, ps > .791, η2 < .01, nor an interaction 
between expectation and social influence, Fs < 1.47, ps > .228, η2 < .01. 
The results of these analyses suggest that participants had a tendency to interpret 
information about the suspect as being consistent with their expectation. This tendency was 
not stronger among those in the social influence conditions compared to those in the no 
social influence conditions. 
Memory. I performed two analyses to examine the hypothesis that participants would 
inaccurately remember information in a manner consistent with their expectation. An 
ANOVA was conducted in which expectations among participants in the social influence 
condition (weak- versus mixed- versus strong-social influence) served as the independent 
variable and participants’ scores on an index of bias served as the dependent variable. Results 
indicated that there was no difference in participants’ scores across conditions, F (2, 63) = 
1.03, p = .362. Next, a 2 (Expectation: weak versus strong) x 2 (Social influence: no social 
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influence versus social influence) ANOVA was conducted in which participants’ scores on 
an index of bias served as the dependent variable. Results indicated a significant main effect 
of expectation, F (1, 86) = 5.35, p = .023, η2 = .06. Participants given a strong expectation 
misremembered more information consistently their expectation (M = .55) than those given a 
weak expectation (M = .04). Results also indicated there was neither a significant main effect 
of social influence, F (1, 86) = 1.03, p = .313, η2 = .01, nor an interaction between 
expectation and social influence, F (1, 86) = 1.17, p = .283, η2 = .01. 
These results indicate that participants were largely accurate in their recognition of 
the facts of the case because participants’ scores on the index of bias were close to zero. 
However, participants with a strong expectation misremember more information in a manner 
consistent with their expectations than participants with a weak expectation.  
 Certainty. Two sets of analyses were conducted regarding certainty. The first 
examined the hypothesis that participants’ would be more confident in their beliefs about the 
suspect’s guilt when socially influenced than when not socially influenced. These analyses 
focused on participants’ confidence in their assessment of the suspect’s guilt and their 
confidence that suspect was the true culprit. 
First, an ANOVA was conducted in which expectations among participants in the 
social influence condition (weak- versus mixed- versus strong-social influence) served as the 
independent variable and participants’ confidence in their assessment of the suspect’s guilt 
served as the dependent variable. Results revealed no difference in participants’ confidence 
across conditions, F (2, 70) = 1.92, p = .154. Next, a 2 (Expectation: weak versus strong) x 2 
(Social influence: no social influence versus social influence) ANOVA was conducted in 
which participants’ confidence in their assessment served as the dependent variable. Results 
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indicated neither main effects were significant nor was the interaction significant, Fs (1, 94) 
< .83, ps > .363, η2 < .01. 
Second, an ANOVA was conducted in which expectations among participants in the 
social influence condition (weak- versus mixed- versus strong-social influence) served as the 
independent variable. Participants’ confidence that the suspect was the true culprit served as 
the dependent variable. Results revealed no difference in participants’ confidence across 
conditions, F (2, 69) = 1.36, p = .252. Next, a 2 (Expectation: weak versus strong) x 2 (Social 
influence: no social influence versus social influence) ANOVA was conducted in which 
participants’ confidence that the suspect was the true culprit served as the dependent variable. 
Results indicated a significant main effect of expectation, F (1, 94) = 5.30, p = .023, η2 = .05. 
Participants given a strong expectation believed the suspect was more likely to be the true 
culprit (M = 4.21) than those given a weak expectation (M = 3.53). Results indicated there 
was neither a significant main effect of social influence, F (1, 94) = 2.66, p = .106, η2 = .03, 
nor an interaction between expectation and social influence, F (1, 94) = 1.09, p = .300, η2 = 
.01. Although the results from this analysis provide some support for confidence, the item 
itself reflects both confidence and a belief in the suspect guilty; thus, the interpretation of the 
responses to this item is not clear. 
Discussion 
The primary goals of Experiment 2 were to (1) determine if perceptual bias effects 
accumulate across perceivers in a situation in which perceivers discuss their strategies for 
interacting with a target and (2) to examine whether biased assimilation and consensus 
processes would contribute to any observed accumulation effect. These goals were addressed 
by conducting an experiment that manipulated expectations, whether or not participants 
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worked together, and the similarity of expectations among those who worked together. 
Accumulation was expected to occur in conditions which participants worked together and 
were induced with similar expectations about the suspect’s guilt. Results indicated that 
cumulative perceptual bias effects were not occurring. Because there was no evidence of 
accumulation, it was not expected that the processes proposed to underlie accumulation 
effects would be observed to a greater extent when participants were induced with similar 
expectations about the suspect’s guilt. Results confirmed this expectation. In the following 
sections, I elaborate on the findings observed in this experiment. 
Accumulation of Perceptual Bias Effects 
 This research examined the hypothesis that perceptual bias effect can accumulation 
across perceivers such that the combined effect of multiple perceivers is larger than the effect 
of any individual perceiver. Results did not support this hypothesis. Participants who worked 
in pairs and who were induced with similar expectations about the suspect’s guilt did not 
have impressions or beliefs that were more in line with their expectations than participants 
who worked alone. Specifically, pairs in which both participants were given a weak 
expectation about the suspect’s guilt did not believe the suspect was any less guilty than 
participants working alone with a weak expectation. The pattern also held for participants 
induced with strong expectations about the suspect’s guilt. Pairs in which both participants 
were given a strong expectation about the suspect’s guilt did not believe the suspect was any 
guiltier than participants working alone with a strong expectation. Overall, results 
consistently revealed no evidence to suggest that the effect of expectation was stronger 
among those induced with similar expectations about the suspect’s guilt. 
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Mechanisms Underlying the Accumulation of Perceptual Bias Effects 
Biased Assimilation. I had originally hypothesized that participants would engage in 
the tendency to seek, interpret, and remember information consistently with their 
expectations to a greater extent when participants had similar expectations. However, 
because results revealed that perceptual bias effects were not accumulating across 
participants, it was unlikely that biased assimilations processes would be occurring to a 
greater extent in conditions in which pairs were induced with similar expectations about the 
suspect’s guilt. Indeed, results indicated that there was no evidence that participants were 
more likely to seek, interpret, or remember information more consistently with their 
expectations in these conditions than in others.  
However, results indicated that biased assimilation processes were still occurring. 
There was some evidence to indicate that participants sought, interpreted, and remembered 
information more consistently with their expectation. Participants induced with a strong 
expectation were selected more accusatory techniques than participants induced with a weak 
expectation. Participants induced with a strong expectation had more negative impressions of 
the suspect’s behavior described by the summary, believed the suspect was being less 
truthful, and believed the strength of the evidence against the suspect was greater than did 
participants induced with a weak expectation. Lastly, although most participants correctly 
identified the facts of the case, participants induced with a strong expectation 
misremembered more information that pointed to the suspect’s guilt than did participants 
induced with a weak expectation. These results suggest that a perceptual bias was operating 
because once the expectation was induced it caused differences in assimilation processes. 
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However, because these tendencies did not occur to larger extent in pairs induced with 
similar expectations, they did not contribute to accumulation. 
Consensus. I had also hypothesized that consensus processes would contribute to the 
accumulation of perceptual bias effects. However, because no accumulation effects were 
observed, I did not expect to find support for consensus processes. The results concerning 
consensus are complicated.  
Participants responded to an item that asked about the perceived similarity of 
opinions with their partner. I expected that because accumulation was not occurring that 
perceived consensus would be low; however, that was not the case. Results indicated that 
approximately 88% of the pairs indicated that they perceived that their impressions of the 
suspect’s guilt were similar to their partner’s. This perceived similarity occurred even among 
participants who were induced with dissimilar expectation (i.e., one with a weak and other 
with a strong expectation). Approximately 78% of the pairs in the dissimilar condition 
indicated that both participants perceived similarity with their partner’s impressions of the 
suspect’s guilt. 
 One possible explanation for why participants perceived such high agreement was 
that the question itself did not fully capture what it was I was trying to measure. Participants 
rated their agreement with the statement “The participant and I had similar opinions.” 
Although I had intended this to measure similar opinions about beliefs of the suspect’s guilt, 
the statement does not explicitly say that. Participants could have agreed with this item for 
several reasons. For example, participants could have agreed because they both felt that the 
case was ambiguous or because they both had wished that more forensic evidence had been 
presented.  
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To examine this possibility, I used other items in the questionnaire to create a new 
measure of perceived similarity. I first identified whether or not participants believed their 
partner thought the suspect was guilty. Next, I examined participants’ responses to the 
dichotomous question of guilt. If participants believed their partner thought the suspect was 
not guilty and participants believed the suspect was not guilty, then they held similar beliefs. 
If participants believed their partner thought the suspect was guilty and participants believed 
the suspect was guilty, then they also held similar beliefs. If there was not symmetry between 
participants’ beliefs about their partner’s rating and their own rating of the suspect’s guilty, 
then they held dissimilar beliefs. Because this was paired data, I then considered similarity 
within pairs. Consistent with the frequencies presented earlier, results indicated that only 
20% of the pairs had either one participant or both indicating a dissimilar perception. These 
results suggest that the high rates of perceived similarity were not the result of a poorly 
worded item. Participants truly perceived similarity in their beliefs about the suspect’s guilt 
and yet, accumulation was not occurring. 
Possible Explanations for the Lack of Accumulation Effects Observed 
 There are several possible reasons why cumulative perceptual bias effects were not 
observed in these data. First, it is possible that the expectation manipulation was ineffective. 
However, the evidence suggests otherwise. Preliminary results indicated that the two 
versions of the case that were used to manipulate participants’ expectations about the 
suspect’s guilt had worked as intended. For example, before any participants interacted there 
was a significant difference in their expectations about the suspect lying, beliefs about the 
plausibility of the suspect’s story, and their impressions of the suspect. Participants who read 
the strong case were more likely to believe the suspect would lie, to believe that the suspect’s 
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story was not plausible, and to have negative impressions of the suspect than participants 
who read the weak case. These results suggest that the lack of accumulation was not due to a 
problem with the expectation manipulation. 
 Second, it is possible that participants did not explicitly state their beliefs about the 
suspect’s guilt while interacting in pairs. What occurred during the participants’ time 
together is not known because pairs worked together privately. However, it is possible that 
neither participant expressed an opinion about the suspect’s guilt to their partner. This could 
explain why so many participants indicated that their partner’s beliefs were similar to their 
own. They may have simply inferred a similar belief because their partner did not explicitly 
state his or her beliefs. This interpretation is consistent with a false consensus effect in which 
people tend to believe that other’s share their beliefs (Ross, Greene, & House, 1977).  
Third, it is possible that participants were somewhat ambivalent in their beliefs about 
the suspect’s guilt. Based on the expectation induced, participants may have leaned in one 
direction more than the other, but they may still have been unconvinced as to what really 
happened. Participants may have expressed their beliefs, but also expressed reservations. If 
these reservations tapped into something the other participant was concerned about, then it is 
possible that these concerns may have attenuated the impact of having shared beliefs. It may 
be that perceived consensus alone is not enough to result in accumulation, but a perception of 
confidence in one’s beliefs may also be important too. Future research is needed to examine 
these possibilities. 
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Chapter 10: General Overview 
 This dissertation sought to examine how perceptual bias effects accumulated across 
people. There exists only one previous investigation of this process (Willard et al., 2008). 
Although the results of Willard et al. investigation did provide evidence in support of 
accumulation, it did not examine how accumulation was occurring. Therefore, for my 
dissertation, I used psychological research and theory to propose a model of cumulative 
perceptual bias effects. This model described relations between two perceivers and a target 
and highlighted possible paths to accumulation.  
 Two experiments tested for accumulation and the extent to which biased assimilation 
(e.g., Olson et al., 1996; Nickerson, 1998) and consensus processes (e.g., Kelley, 1973)) 
served as underlying mechanisms in the accumulation of perceptual bias effects. Both of 
these experiments attempted to more clearly elucidate how accumulation was occurring by 
holding constant the target’s behavior through the use of a fabricated target. Thus, these 
experiments examined whether accumulation could occur without interacting with a target, 
but through interaction among perceivers. The previous investigation of accumulation 
included a interaction with both perceivers and a target, which makes it impossible to 
determine if the effect was due to the interaction between perceivers, the interaction with a 
target, or both (Willard et al., 2008). The form of interaction between perceivers differed in 
the two experiments. In Experiment 1, perceivers never interacted with one another; instead, 
they were exposed to a purported other’s beliefs about the target through a written statement. 
In Experiment 2, some perceivers interacted with one another to select strategies for how 
they would interact with the target if given the chance, while others selected their strategies 
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alone. Both experiments included items that measured biased assimilation processes and 
consensus.  
Overview of Results 
 The results of these investigations were not straightforward. The results from 
Experiment 1 indicated that accumulation was occurring. Furthermore, results provided some 
support for biased assimilation processes as contributing to the observed accumulation effect. 
There was some evidence to indicate that perceivers interpreted and remembered information 
about the target in a manner that was consistent with their expectations, suggesting that a 
perceptual bias was occurring. The tendency to interpret and remember information in a 
biased manner occurred to a greater extent when perceivers perceived similarity with the 
purported other’s beliefs about the suspect’s guilt, suggesting that these processes may have 
facilitated the accumulation of perceptual bias effect. Results did not suggest that perceived 
similarity with another’s beliefs made perceivers more confident in their beliefs. However, 
perceptions of consensus did influence whether or not perceptual bias effects accumulated. 
The accumulation pattern was only observed among perceivers perceiving consensus. 
 In contrast, the results from Experiment 2 provided no evidence for accumulation, 
though the results did suggest that biased assimilation processes were occurring. That is, 
consistent with pervious research, perceivers’ expectations did influence how they sought, 
interpreted, and remembered information (e.g., Olson et al., 1996). However, none of these 
processes occurred to a greater extent among perceivers with similar expectations working in 
pairs. In a way, this finding supports the proposition that biased assimilation processes may 
contribute to the accumulation of perceptual bias effects. If accumulation is not observed, 
then one would not expect to find evidence of these processes operating to a greater extent 
106 
 
 
when two perceivers’ share expectations than when only one perceiver has the expectation. 
Thus, even though the two experiments provided discrepant results, they were generally 
consistent in regards the processes proposed to be operating in the accumulation process 
Making Sense of the Findings  
 The results of this dissertation provided mixed evidence for the accumulation of 
perceptual bias effects. Experiment 1 provided evidence of cumulative perceptual bias effects 
and also demonstrated that biased assimilation processes and, in particular, perceived 
consensus contributed to these effects. Experiment 2 provided no evidence of cumulative 
perceptual bias effects in a situation in which perceivers worked in pairs and perceived 
consensus between each other. Yet another layer of complexity is added by taking into 
consideration the findings regarding the previous investigation of accumulation, which found 
evidence in support of accumulation in an experiment in which perceivers also interacted 
(Willard et al., 2008). Thus, the major question is why did perceptual bias effects not 
accumulate in Experiment 2 considering (1) Experiment 1 found accumulation, (2) in 
Experiment 2 perceivers’ perceived consensus, and (2) in Experiment 2 the situation was 
most similar to the previous investigation finding support of accumulation. This question 
may be answered by examining methodological differences among the three experiments. 
 Perceived consensus was shown to be an important factor in Experiment 1. 
Accumulation findings were only observed among those who perceived consensus. However, 
in Experiment 2, no accumulation effects were observed and yet there was a high level of 
perceived consensus among participants. This difference may have been due to the 
explicitness of the beliefs expressed. In Experiment 1, the statements from a purported other 
explicitly communicated the bogus participant’s beliefs. In Experiment 2, I had no control 
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over the communication of perceivers’ beliefs. It is possible that perceivers may not have 
expressed their beliefs at all and thus, they were not communicated sufficiently for 
accumulation to occur. This explanation may account for why there was such high perceived 
consensus in Experiment 2. Perceivers may have simply assumed that the other person felt as 
they did; thus, possibility resulting in a case of false consensus (Ross, Greene, & House, 
1977). However, this does not address why accumulation did not occur. Even if the beliefs 
were not explicit, perceptual biases still should have accumulated because perceivers’ 
perceived consensus. 
 Another possibility could be the level of confidence in which perceivers’ beliefs were 
expressed. In Experiment 1, the statements from a purported other both explicitly and 
confidently communicated the bogus participant’s beliefs. The written statements indicated 
that the bogus participant had no doubts as to what he or she believed. In Experiment 2, it is 
possible that participants expressed their beliefs, but were not confident enough in their 
beliefs to exacerbate perceptual bias effects. The perceivers’ expression of uncertain beliefs 
may have resulted in perceived consensus and yet, because these beliefs were uncertain, they 
did not influence their partner’s beliefs. There are at least two reasons to believe that 
confidence in the expression of beliefs may have contributed to the lack of accumulation 
effects observed in Experiment 2.   
 First, the expectation induced may have worked in the intended manner but also left 
perceivers somewhat uncertain. The cases used to manipulate perceivers’ expectations in 
Experiments 1 and 2 included information that both supported and contradicted their 
expectations. Perceivers given a weak expectation learned information that suggested the 
suspect was guilty and perceivers given a strong expectation learned information that 
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suggested the suspect was not guilty. The information used to manipulate perceivers’ 
expectations in the previous investigation was very different (Willard et al., 2008). In the 
previous investigation, it was an expectation for a specific personality characteristic (i.e., 
hostility) and this expectation was delivered in the form of an official looking printout that 
was either blank or clearly labeled the target as having a hostile personality. Perhaps the 
confidence of a partner’s beliefs was less of an issue in that situation because perceivers’ 
were induced with clear expectations about the target. In this dissertation, the confidence 
with which a partner expressed a belief may have been an important factor.  
In Experiments 1 and 2, participants’ expectations were induced using two versions 
of a criminal case that could have raised more questions than it answered. Research has 
suggested that people with unclear self-concepts and those placed in ambiguous situations are 
more likely to be socially influenced (Allen, 1965; Swan & Ely, 1984; Tesser, Campbell, & 
Mickler, 1983). This may have prompted perceivers in Experiment 1 to be socially 
influenced by another participant’s explicit beliefs, which led to accumulation effects. In 
Experiment 2, if perceivers did not have clear or confident beliefs, then perhaps neither 
perceiver was likely use their partner’s beliefs to help them make a decision about the target.  
 Second, the circumstances in which perceivers interacted in Experiment 2 may have 
contributed to the level of certainty expressed. Perceivers in Experiment 2 selected their 
strategies for interacting with the target together. At that point, perceivers had not committed 
themselves to a course of action and may have still been trying to figure out what to think 
about the target. In contrast, in the previous investigation of accumulation (Willard et al., 
2008), perceivers had already chosen their strategies for interacting with the target before 
they interacted with each other. Therefore, having to take the time to think about their 
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strategies may have solidified their impressions of the target. By the time they interacted with 
their partner they may have communicated their beliefs about the target more strongly.  
As stated previously, what occurred during the interaction between perceivers in 
Experiment 2 is unknown. Future research should examine what naturally occurs in 
interactions between perceivers, as well as a more systematic manipulation of some of the 
potential factors proposed above to more clearly understand the circumstances in which 
cumulative perceptual bias effects will likely occur. 
Implications 
 This dissertation makes several contributions to the understanding of perceptual bias 
effects. First, previous research has indicated that the size of expectancy effects, including 
perceptual bias effects, is typically modest (Jussim et al., 1996). However, there are certain 
psychological processes that could result in above average effect sizes. The accumulation of 
perceptual bias effects across perceivers represents one situation where many psychological 
processes may be operating to result in a larger than average effect size. Results from 
Experiment 1 suggested that biased assimilation and perceived consensus may contribute to 
an accumulation effect. These results are consistent with the proposition that the literature 
may be underestimating the magnitude of perceptual bias effects because investigations have 
generally tended to focus on situation involving only one perceiver. This dissertation 
provides justification, that at least under some circumstances, it is important to examine the 
influence of multiple perceivers. 
 Second, this dissertation provides a starting point for systematically examining how 
perceptual bias effects accumulate across perceivers. As outlined in the introduction, there 
are many possible paths that could lead to accumulation. Results from Experiment 1 
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suggested that accumulation can occur without direct contact with another perceiver. Thus, 
the accumulation effect does not seem to be limited to one-on-one contact between 
perceivers. In this increasing high tech world, there are many instances in which multiple 
perceivers may be evaluating a target, but rarely, if ever, have contact with one another. It is 
possible that the accumulation of perceptual bias effects may be occurring quite frequently. 
 Third, Experiment 1 demonstrated that perceived consensus is an important factor in 
determining whether or not perceptual bias effects will accumulate. However, in Experiment 
2 perceivers perceived consensus, but there was no evidence for accumulation. Results from 
that experiment indicate that perceived consensus alone may not be sufficient to cause 
accumulation. Thus, like may processes within social psychology, the accumulation of 
perceptual bias effects appears to be a multifaceted process. 
 Fourth, this dissertation examined the accumulation process within the context of a 
criminal investigation. Researchers have speculated that biases generated early in an 
investigation have the potential to start a chain of events that could ultimately lead to a false 
arrest (Kassin, Goldstein, & Savitsky, 2003; Findley & Scott, 2006). Results from 
Experiment 1 provided some support for this proposition. Expectations provided to 
perceivers at the start of the experiment subsequently influenced processing of later 
information. Furthermore, expectations influenced processing of information to larger extent 
when perceivers perceived consensus with another. It is not preposterous to suggest that 
investigators may find themselves in a similar situation. That is, a situation in which multiple 
investigators holding similar expectations about the guilt of the suspect work to solve an 
ambiguous case. It is also possible that the accumulation of perceptual bias effects could 
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occur at several points in the span of a case, from investigation though prosecution of a 
suspect.  
Limitations 
 There are several limitations of this research that warrant discussion. First, as 
discussed earlier, the interaction between pairs of perceivers in Experiment 2 is not known. 
These interactions took place in private. Additionally, the measures that were collected did 
not include items that sufficiently captured participants’ perceptions of what occurred during 
their interaction. The few questions that addressed participants’ beliefs about their partner 
turned out to be incredibly important. Knowing more about what happened during the 
interaction and what perceivers’ thought about one another (e.g., their confidence in their 
partner’s expectation) could have helped answer questions about why accumulation occurred 
in one experiment but not the other. Future research will need to examine perceivers’ 
interactions more thoroughly.   
 Second, it is important to note that the context in which this process was examined is 
somewhat limited in terms of its generalizability. Admittedly, the investigative process in the 
real world is much different than the one that took place in these experiments. There are 
many factors that do not truly represent what happens in the real world. From the expertise of 
the investigators to the amount of information provided on a case, there are a number of 
differences. However, that does not mean that the accumulation process is not relevant to this 
context. The information gleaned from this investigation provides another perspective for 
exploring potential problems within the legal system.  
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Conclusion  
 This dissertation contributes important information for understanding how and when 
expectations can shape social reality. It provides evidence that biased assimilation processes 
and perceived consensus are significant factors in the occurrence of cumulative perceptual 
bias effects. However, it also indicates that they are clearly not the only factors that 
determine whether an accumulation process will occur. Situational circumstances and 
dispositional characteristics may also play a role and influence the degree to which these 
processes contribute to cumulative perceptual bias effects. At the very least, this dissertation 
clearly highlights the need for further investigation into the complex accumulation process. 
Furthermore, this dissertation examined the accumulation of perceptual bias effects 
within the context of a criminal investigation. This is a unique context that has applications 
for understanding factors and procedures that may contribute to errors within the legal 
system. Although college students played the part of investigators, it is unlikely that real 
investigators are immune from the influence of their own and others’ expectations.  
As this dissertation indicated, perceivers’ evaluations, interpretations, and memory 
were influenced by initial expectations. Perceived consensus with another perceiver 
exacerbated these differences, at least within one study. Thus, the accumulation process has 
the potential to reinforce inaccurate expectations and channel social interactions in ways that 
may place targets at a disadvantage. The belief that one’s inaccurate expectation has been 
confirmed can have serious negative consequences, not just within context examined, but 
other contexts as well. The accumulation of perceptual bias effects observed in this 
dissertation and the identification of associated processes provide an important contribution 
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to a long line of research investigating how people’s inaccurate expectations can shape 
reality. 
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Figure 1. Conceptual model: The relations between two perceivers’ expectations about a target and their subsequent impressions 
of the target.  
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Figure 2. Experiment 1. Conceptual model: The relations between two perceivers’ expectations about a target and their 
subsequent impressions of the target. The bold paths indicate the possible relations examined in Experiment 1.  
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Figure 3. Experiment2. Conceptual model: The relations between two perceivers’ expectations about a target and their subsequent 
impressions of the target. The bold paths indicate the possible relations examined in Experiment 2.  
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Figure 4. Experiment 1: Percentage of participants indicating that the suspect was guilty by 
expectation and social influence. 
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Figure 5. Experiment 1: Percentage of participants indicating that the suspect was guilty by 
expectation and social influence. 
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Figure 6. Experiment 1: Participants’ mean ratings of their impressions of the suspect based 
on expectation, social influence, and perceived similarity. 
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Figure 7. Experiment 1: Participants’ mean ratings of their beliefs about the suspect 
murdering the victim based on expectation, social influence, and perceived similarity. 
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Table 1 
Preliminary Study 2: Mean ratings of the aggressiveness and guilt-presumptiveness of interview/interrogation techniques. 
Techniques Label Aggress Guilt Keep 
Make it clear that these questions are a procedural formality that has to be followed. N 1.25 1.65 X 
Be sympathetic towards the suspect’s confusions during the questioning process. N 1.35 1.80 X 
Let the suspect know that others are being investigated and that more evidence is being gathered. N 1.55 1.80 X 
Inform the suspect that he or she does not need to be afraid, because the evidence of the case will 
eventually be found. 
N 1.80 2.15 X 
Appeal to the importance of cooperation by enlisting the suspect’s help in solving the crime. N 1.70 2.20 X 
Reassure the suspect that the investigator is an expert and will handle the case fairly. N 1.35 2.25 X 
Tell the suspect that he or she is only being asked questions to learn more about the crime, in 
general, when in fact he or she is suspected of committing the crime. 
A 2.25 2.50  
Trick the suspect into believing that he or she is showing physical signs of guilt even though he or 
she is not. 
A 3.25 2.50  
Attempt to trick the suspect by presenting false evidence that indicates his or her guilt. A 3.35 2.60 X 
Present physical evidence to suspect in an unbiased manner. N 2.00 2.65  
Confuse or disorient the suspect to make him or her feel emotionally or psychological unstable. A 3.65 2.70  
Pretend to sympathize with the suspect’s situation by telling the suspect that the crime committed 
was understandable given the situation. 
A 2.00 2.85 X 
Explain how the suspect’s description of what happened during the crime doesn’t make sense. A 2.50 2.90  
Make the suspect believe that it is in his or her best interest to confess. A 2.55 2.95 X 
Suggest to the suspect that a family member or friend might be either brought into the investigation 
or negatively affected if the suspect does not cooperate or confess. 
A 3.00 3.00  
Make the suspect believe that the evidence will prove that he or she is guilty of the crime and that 
lying to interrogators won’t help in the long run. 
A 2.80 3.05 X 
Repeatedly accuse the suspect of having committed the crime. A 3.45 3.05 X 
Use flattery or praise to make the suspect feel good or proud of having committed the crime. A 2.00 3.10 X 
Make the suspect feel guilty about having committed the crime. A 2.85 3.20 X 
Overwhelm the suspect with the amount of evidence against him or her. A 3.25 3.20 X 
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Table 2     
Preliminary Study 2: Mean ratings of the aggressiveness and guilt-presumptiveness of interview/interrogation questions and statements 
Question/Statement Label Aggress Guilt Keep 
I realize that you have just gone through a true traumatic situation, but anything you can 
remember would be helpful. 
N 1.15 1.60 X 
Had you ever previously seen the suspected male? N 1.35 1.70 X 
When the man was attacking you did you notice any distinguishing characteristics, such as 
birthmarks or tattoos? 
N 1.40 1.80 X 
Is anything missing from the apartment that you know of? N 1.15 1.80 X 
In your opinion did the intruder appear to know his way around the apartment? N 1.40 1.90 X 
Had you noticed anyone suspicious around the apartment recently? N 1.35 1.90 X 
We’re not here to come down on you…we just want to know what happened. N 1.40 1.90 X 
Had the victim been upset the past couple of days? N 1.15 1.90 X 
What were you doing when the man broke into the apartment? N 1.80 1.95 X 
Did you lock the door to the apartment because you were scared the man might come back? N 1.70 1.95 X 
Do you know any reason why someone would want to hurt the victim? N 1.60 2.00 X 
Could you explain what happened the day the victim was killed? N 1.35 2.05  
Can you describe what this alleged intruder looked like? A 1.30 2.05  
So you were friends with the victim? N 1.55 2.10  
Did the male say anything to you or the victim during his time in the apartment? N 1.30 2.10  
Were you aware that the victim’s assistant left for lunch at the same time everyday? A 1.60 2.35  
How much did you dislike the victim? A 2.20 2.40  
Why had you gone to see the victim that day? N 1.65 2.50  
How is it that you were able to fight off this man and the victim wasn’t? A 2.20 2.75 X 
If the intruder ran out the front door, why was it locked when the police showed up? A 2.45 2.80 X 
Explain to me how you could do something like this. A 3.10 3.00 X 
Maybe it is possible the victim isn’t quite so innocent after all, but it is hard for me to know what 
to think when you don’t explain why you did it. 
A 
3.15 3.10 X 
Why didn’t you call the police after the alleged intruder left? Busy coming up with a story? A 3.05 3.15 X 
How do you think your husband is going to react when he finds out what you’ve done? A 3.30 3.20  
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Table 2 Continued     
Preliminary Study 2: Mean ratings of the aggressiveness and guilt-presumptiveness of 
interview/interrogation questions and statements. 
    
Question/Statement Label Aggress Guilt Keep 
You know, I’m sure you had good reasons for doing what you did. Why don’t you explain them 
to me and maybe I can help. 
A 
2.00 3.25 X 
Are you going to start telling the truth about what happened or are you going to continue to make 
this hard on yourself? 
A 
3.47 3.30 X 
You expect us to believe that you had nothing to do with this? A 3.15 3.30 X 
Don’t lie to me. You insult my intelligence and I don’t like to be insulted. A 3.30 3.5 X 
Had you been thinking about killing the victim for awhile or did it just sort of happen? A 3.30 3.6 X 
Before you open your mouth to lie again, I want you to think carefully about whether you’d rather 
be charged with first-degree murder or manslaughter. 
A 
3.75 3.65 X 
Note. Label indicates whether the question or statement was designed to be accusatory (A) or non-accusatory (N). Aggress 
indicates participants’ mean ratings of each item’s aggressiveness with high scores representing more aggressive items. Guilt 
indicates participants’ mean ratings of each item’s guilt-presumptiveness with high score representing more guilt-presumptive 
items. Keep indicates which items were retained for the main experiments. 
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Table 3  
Coding system for Index of Bias 
Statement True Unsure False 
Eva stated that she locked the door because she thought the 
intruder might return. 
-1 0 0 
Eva had been seeing a therapist for emotional problems. +1 0 0 
Eva displayed guilty behavior during the interrogation. +1 0 -1 
Eva called the police. -1 0 0 
Eva had the victim’s blood on her clothes. +1 0 -1 
No one reported seeing a man at the apartment at the time of 
the offense. 
+1 0 0 
Eva’s fingerprints were found on the knife. +1 0 -1 
Note. Positive values indicate an incorrect response that is consistent with a belief that the 
suspect is guilty. Negative values indicate an incorrect response that is consistent with a 
belief the suspect is not guilty.   
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Table 4 
Experiment 1: Gender information presented for each condition 
Condition Male Female Missing Total 
Weak-social influence 21 12 0 33 
Weak-no social influence 20 16 0 36 
Strong-no social influence 24 13 0 37 
Strong-social influence 20 14 1 35 
Note. N = 141. 
 
 
 
  
 
Table 5 
Experiment 1: Correlations, means, and standard deviations for primary measures 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
(1) Expect suspect to lie  -.59** .49** .29** .26** -.41** -.42** .58** .16 .12 .44** 
(2) Impressions   -.46** -.23** -.30** .42** .39** -.60** -.24** -.16 -.46** 
(3) Suspect murdered the  
      victim 
   .33** .29** -.51** -.64** .55** .34** .37** .79** 
(4) Number of guilt- 
      presumptive  
      techniques 
    .52** -.09 -.16 .35** .20* .12 .36** 
(5) Number of guilt- 
      presumptive questions    
      and statements 
     -.14 -.17 .30** .15 .05 .36** 
(6) Impressions of suspect  
      based on summary 
      .70** -.49** -.21** -.28** -.56** 
(7) Suspect’s truthfulness        -.52** -.28** -.29** -.65** 
(8) Strength of evidence         .23** .25** .65** 
(9) Index of bias          .17 .28** 
(10) Confidence in  
        assessment of    
        suspect’s guilt 
          .30** 
(11) Confident that the    
        suspect is the culprit 
           
M 3.94 3.57 3.38 2.17 3.15 3.18 3.11 3.08 .16 4.04 3.36 
SD .92 .70 1.11 1.55 1.63 .65 .91 .67 1.51 .85 1.08 
Note. *p < .05. **p < .01. 
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Table 6 
Experiment 1: Full sample: ANOVAs for accumulation of perceptual bias effects. 
 Impressions Murder 
Source df F η df F η 
 Between Subjects Between Subjects 
Expectation 1 15.07*** .10 1 1.40 >.01 
Social influence 1 .01 >.01 1 .40 >.01 
Expectation x 
social influence 
1  3.02 .02 1 1.02 >.01 
     
S within-group 
error 
136 (.44)  133 (1.12)  
Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors. S = subjects. Impression refers 
to participants’ impressions of the suspect and Murder refers to participants’ beliefs about the 
suspect murdering the victim.  
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
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Table 7 
Experiment 1: ANOVAs for accumulation of perceptual bias effects. 
 Impressions Murder 
Source df F η df F η 
 Between Subjects Between Subjects 
Expectation 1 19.39*** .15 1 9.87** .08 
Social influence 1    .10 >.01 1 .01 >.01 
Expectation x 
social influence 
1  6.57* .05 1 8.92** .07 
     
S within-group 
error 
108 (.44)  104 (1.11)  
Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors. S = subjects. Impression refers 
to participants’ impressions of the suspect and Murder refers to participants’ beliefs about the 
suspect murdering the victim.  
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
 
 
  
 
 
Table 8 
Experiment 1: ANOVAs for seeking information. 
 
# of accusatory 
techniques 
# of accusatory questions 
& statements 
Aggressiveness of 
questions & statements 
Guilt-presumptiveness 
of questions & 
statements 
Source df F η df F η df F η df F η 
 Between subjects Between subjects Between subjects Between subjects 
Expectation 1 3.60 .03 1 4.25* .04 1 4.11* .04 1 3.71 .03 
Social influence 1 .10 >.01 1 .18 >.01 1 .01 >.01 1 .03 >.01 
Expectation x social 
influence 
1 .10 >.01 1 .72 >.01 1 .05 >.01 1 .01 >.01 
         
S within-group error 107 (2.37)  101 (2.24)  105 (.10)  105 (.08)  
Note. Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors. S = subjects. 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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Table 9 
Experiment 1: ANOVAs for interpreting information. 
Source 
Impressions of suspect’s 
behavior 
Truthfulness of suspect Strength of evidence 
 df F η df F η df F η 
 Between subjects Between subjects Between subjects 
Expectation 1 1.05 >.01 1 8.30** .07 1 19.70*** .15 
Social influence 1 .10 >.01 1 .47 >.01 1 .08 >.01 
Expectation x social influence 1 2.85 .03 1 4.31* .04 1 4.81* .04 
          
S within-group error 108 (.47)  108 (.83)  108 (.63)  
Note. Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors. S = subjects. 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
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Table 10 
Summary of hierarchical regression analyses for condition and truthfulness predicting 
impressions and beliefs about the suspect murdering the victim 
 Impressions Murder 
Variable B SE B β B SE B β 
Step 1       
  Condition  -.29 .06 -.41*** .36 .10 .33*** 
Step 2       
  Condition -.21 .06 -.30*** .19 .09 .17* 
  Truthfulness .30 .06 .39*** -.70 .09 -.58*** 
Note. R2 = .17 for Step 1; ∆R2 = .14 for Step 2 (ps < .001) for impressions. R2 = .11 for Step 
1; ∆R2 = .31 for Step 2 (ps < .001) for murder. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.  
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Table 11 
Summary of hierarchical regression analyses for condition and strength of evidence 
predicting impressions and beliefs about the suspect murdering the victim 
 Impressions Murder 
Variable B SE B β B SE B β 
Step 1       
  Condition  -.30 .06 -.41*** .37 .10 .33*** 
Step 2       
  Condition -.12 .06 -.17* .12 .10 .10 
  Strength of    
  evidence 
-.61 .08 -.60*** .86 .14 .54*** 
Note. R2 = .17 for Step 1; ∆R2 = .30 for Step 2 (ps < .001) for impressions. R2 = .11 for Step 
1; ∆R2 = .24 for Step 2 (ps < .001) for murder. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.  
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Table 12 
Experiment 1: ANOVA for remembering information. 
 Index of bias 
Source df F η 
 Between Subjects 
Expectation 1 2.36 .02 
Social influence 1    .62 >.01 
Expectation x social influence 1  7.29** .07 
    
S within-group error 101 (2.03)  
Note. Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors. S = subjects.  
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
  
143 
 
 
Table 13 
Summary of hierarchical regression analyses for condition and index of bias predicting 
impressions and beliefs about the suspect murdering the victim 
 Impressions Murder 
Variable B SE B β B SE B β 
Step 1       
  Condition  -.32 .07 -.44*** .36 .10 .32*** 
Step 2       
  Condition -.29 .06 -.40*** .30 .10 .27** 
  Strength of    
  evidence 
-.11 .04 -.22* .22 .07 .28** 
Note. R2 = .19 for Step 1; ∆R2 = .05 for Step 2 (ps < .013) for impressions. R2 = .10 for Step 
1; ∆R2 = .08 for Step 2 (ps < .003) for murder. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
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Table 14 
Experiment 1: ANOVAs for confidence. 
 Confidence in assessment Confidence in suspect as 
culprit 
Source df F η df F η 
 Between subjects Between subjects 
Expectation 1 .05 <.01 1 7.50** .07 
Social influence 1 1.28 .01 1 .45 <.01 
Expectation x social 
influence 
1 .64 <.01 1 3.03 .03 
       
S within-group error 108 (.80)  104 (1.14)  
Note. Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors. S = subjects.  
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
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Table 15 
Experiment 1: ANOVAs for perceived similarity. 
 Impression Murder 
Source df F η df F η 
 Between subjects Between subjects 
Expectation 1 13.95*** .09 1 1.04 <.01 
Similarity 1    .27 <.01 1 .44 <.01 
Expectation x similarity 1  4.10* .05 1 8.42*** .11 
       
S within-group error 108 (.43)  104 (1.10)  
Note. Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors. S = subjects. Impression 
refers to participants’ impressions of the suspect and Murder refers to participants’ beliefs 
about the suspect murdering the victim.  
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
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Table 16 
Experiment 1: ANOVAs for exploratory analyses with gender 
 Impression Murder 
Source df F η df F η 
 Between subjects Between subjects 
Expectation 1 14.25*** .09 1 1.15 <.01 
Similarity 2    .27 <.01 2 .34 <.01 
Gender 1 .03 <.01 1 .35 <.01 
Expectation x similarity 2  4.76* .06 2 8.13*** .11 
Expectation x gender 1 1.21 <.01 1 .01 <.01 
Similarity x gender 2 .05 <.01 2 1.67 .02 
Expectation x similarity 
x Gender 
2 .71 .01 2 .15 <.01 
S within-group error 127 (.44)  124 (1.12)  
Note. Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors. S = subjects. Impression 
refers to participants’ impressions of the suspect and Murder refers to participants’ beliefs 
about the suspect murdering the victim. The similarity variable includes no social influence, 
similar-social influence, and dissimilar-social influence. 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
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Table 17 
Experiment 2: Gender information presented for each condition 
Condition Male Female Mixed Total 
Individuals     
  Weak-no social influence 15 8 NA 23 
  Strong-no social influence 16 10 NA 26 
Pairs     
  Weak-social influence 6 9 9 24 
  Mixed-social influence 4 10 10 24 
  Strong-social influence 6 7 12 25 
  
 
Table 18 
Experiment 2: ANOVAs for expectation manipulation 
Source Plausibility of suspect’s account Expecting suspect to lie Impressions of the suspect 
 df F η df F η df F η 
 Between subjects Between subjects Between subjects 
Expectation 1 9.77** .04 1 7.06** .03 1 10.07** .05 
Social influence 1 2.10 .01 1 3.15 .02 1 .41 <.01 
Expectation x social 
influence 
1 .54 <.01 1 .24 <.01 1 .70 <.01 
          
S within-group error 199 (1.15)  199 (.94)  198 (.50)  
Note. Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors. S = subjects.  
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
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Table 19 
Experiment 2: Correlations, means, and standard deviations for primary measures for no social influence conditions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
(1) Suspect murdered the  
      victim 
 .41** .37* -.48** -.56** .50** .25 .22 .84** 
(2) Number of guilt- 
      presumptive  
      techniques 
  .63** -.44** -.25 .33* .02 .41** .23 
(3) Number of guilt- 
      presumptive questions     
      and statements 
   -.40** -.26 .20 .22 .26 .24 
(4) Impressions of suspect  
      based on summary 
    .72** -.40** -.01 -.27 -.34* 
(5) Suspect’s truthfulness      -.35* -.08 -.16 -.24 
(6) Strength of evidence       .42** .20 .26 
(7) Index of bias        -.03 .24 
(8) Confidence in  
        assessment of    
        suspect’s guilt 
        .08 
(9) Confident that the    
        suspect is the culprit 
         
          
          
M 3.72 2.39 3.08 2.99 2.94 2.97 .22 4.01 4.06 
SD 1.19 1.78 1.83 .70 .97 .77 1.26 .89 1.65 
Note. *p < .05. **p < .01. 
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Table 20 
Experiment 2: Correlations, means, and standard deviations for primary measures for social influence conditions. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
(1) Suspect murdered the  
      victim 
 .79** .40* -.55** -.71** .69** .28* .48** .79** 
(2) Number of guilt- 
      presumptive  
      techniques 
  .48** -.23* -.38** .40** .21 .26* .33* 
(3) Number of guilt- 
      presumptive questions     
      and statements 
   -.21 -.29* .48** .14 .29* .37** 
(4) Impressions of suspect  
      based on summary 
    .62** -.40** -.31* -.20 -.50** 
(5) Suspect’s truthfulness      -.58** -.26* -.27* -.57* 
(6) Strength of evidence       .22 .52** .66** 
(7) Index of bias        -.19 .12 
(8) Confidence in  
        assessment of    
        suspect’s guilt 
        .51** 
(9) Confident that the    
        suspect is the culprit 
         
          
          
M 3.73 2.36 2.99 2.99 2.85 3.04 .33 4.10 3.66 
SD .76 1.70 1.35 .40 .61 .53 .87 .66 .74 
Note. *p < .05. **p < .01 
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Table 21 
Experiment 2: Frequencies for perceived consensus among social influence conditions 
 2 participants 
perceived 
dissimilarity 
1 participant 
perceived 
dissimilarity 
2 participants 
perceived 
similarity 
Missing 
information 
Weak-social influence 0 2 20 2 
Mixed-social influence 2 3 17 2 
Strong-social influence 0 2 20 3 
Note. Frequencies indicate the number of pairs of participants indicating similarity by social 
influence. 
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Table 22 
Experiment 2: Frequencies of paired and individual responses of suspect’s guilt 
Condition Not guilty Not guilty & guilty Guilty 
Social influence:    
    Weak 5 21% 10 42% 9 37% 
    Mixed 0 0% 7 30% 16 70% 
    Strong 1 4% 8 25% 17 71% 
No social influence:    
    Weak 12 52% NA 11 48% 
    Strong 5 19% NA 21 81% 
Note. In the social influence conditions, responses indicate both guilt responses and the 
similarity in responses across pairs of participants. Percentages represent within condition 
percentages. 
 
  
 
Table 23 
Experiment 2: One-way ANOVAs for seeking information among social influence conditions 
Source SS df MS F 
Number of accusatory techniques selected     
    Between groups 27.09 2 13.54 5.20** 
    Within error 181.65 70 2.60  
    Total 208.74 72   
Number of accusatory questions & 
statements selected 
    
    Between groups 6.57 2 3.29 1.85 
    Within error 122.41 69 1.77  
    Total 129.00 71   
Average item-aggressiveness of questions & 
statements selected 
    
    Between groups .18 2 .09 1.30 
    Within error 4.82 70 .70  
    Total 5.00 72   
Average item-guilt-presumptiveness of 
questions & statements selected 
    
    Between groups .23 2 .12 2.01 
    Within error 4.05 70 .06  
    Total 4.29 72   
Note. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
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Table 24 
Experiment 2: ANOVAs for seeking information 
 
# of Accusatory 
Techniques 
# of Accusatory 
Questions & Statements 
Aggressiveness of 
Questions & Statements 
Guilt-presumptiveness 
of Questions & 
Statements 
Source df F η df F η df F η df F η 
 Between Subjects Between Subjects Between Subjects Between Subjects 
Expectation 1 16.07*** .15 1 11.04** .11 1 11.42** .11 1 10.40** .10 
Social influence 1 .06 <.01 1 .02 <.01 1 .01 <.01 1 .07 <.01 
Expectation x social 
influence 
1 .12 <.01 1 1.91 .02 1 3.16 .03 1 1.93 .02 
             
S within-group error 94 (2.72)  92 (2.42)  93 (.09)  93 (.08)  
Note. Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors. S = subjects. 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
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Table 25 
Experiment 2: One-way ANOVAs for interpreting information among social influence conditions 
Source SS df MS F 
Impressions of suspect’s behavior     
    Between groups 1.46 2 .73 5.09** 
    Within error 9.87 69 .14  
    Total 11.33 71   
Truthfulness of suspect     
    Between groups 2.52 2 1.26  
    Within error 24.09 70 .34 3.66* 
    Total 26.60 72   
Strength of evidence     
    Between groups .96 2 .48 1.78 
    Within error 18.96 70 .27  
    Total 19.92 72   
Note. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
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Table 26 
Experiment 2: ANOVAs for interpreting information. 
Source Impressions of suspect’s behavior Truthfulness of suspect Strength of evidence 
 df F η df F η df F η 
 Between subjects Between subjects Between subjects 
Expectation 1 7.92** .08 1 5.36* .05 1 7.42** .07 
Social influence 1 .30 <.01 1 .01 <.01 1 .04 <.01 
Expectation x social 
influence 
1 .30 <.01 1 .02 <.01 1 1.47 .01 
          
S within-group error 93 (.32)  94 (.65)  94 (.42)  
Note. Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors. S = subjects.  
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
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Appendix A: Case information 
 
Weak Case: 
A woman is found dead in an apartment. The victim is Sarah, a psychiatrist who had her 
office in the apartment. A second woman, Eva, is encountered in the apartment and thus, a 
suspect in the case. Eva is an acquaintance of the victim. Eva’s husband was a client of the 
victim. The victim had recently received several phone calls from an anonymous man who 
each time threatened to kill her with a knife. The victim had reported these phone calls to the 
police and told the police that she thought the man must be a patient or a former patient. The 
following observations have been made thus far in the investigation: 
 
Strong Case: 
A woman is found dead in an apartment. The victim is Sarah, a psychiatrist who had her 
office in the apartment. A second woman, Eva, is encountered in the apartment and thus, a 
suspect in the case. Eva is an acquaintance of the victim. Eva’s husband was a client of the 
victim and therefore, Eva’s husband and the victim had regular contact. According to the 
victim’s assistant, Eva had expressed suspicion about a sexual relationship between the 
victim and Eva’s husband. The victim’s assistant stated that Eva was deeply jealous. The 
following observations have been made thus far in the investigation: 
 
Examples of Observations: 
1. The crime was committed at lunchtime. 
2. When the victim’s assistant returned from lunch she found the apartment door locked 
from the inside. 
3. The assistant got worried and decided to call the police. 
4. The policemen arrived within a few minutes. 
5. They also found the door locked from the inside. 
6. After a few minutes of pounding on the door and ringing the doorbell Eva opened the 
door. 
7. Eva had cuts in her hands and signs of beating to the face. 
8. She also had bloodstains on her clothes. 
9. She was in a state of shock. 
10. The police found the victim’s body in the apartment. 
11. The police found a knife next to the body. 
12. Eva denies all guilt. 
13. She claims that an unknown, male intruder attacked the victim with the knife. 
14. She allegedly tried to stop the offense and the perpetrator dropped the knife. 
15. She also claims that she got hurt at that same moment. 
16. She says that the intruder knocked her down and fled through the apartment door. 
17. The suspect claims that the perpetrator wore gloves. 
18. A neighbor told the police that he had seen a man running down the street outside the 
victim’s apartment by the time of the offense. 
19. The neighbor said that the man did not wear gloves. 
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Appendix B: Preliminary Study 1 questionnaire 
 
1. I think that the Eva’s description of what happened is believable. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree 
Somewha
t disagree 
Somewha
t agree 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
2. During an interview with Eva, I would expect her to lie. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree 
Somewha
t disagree 
Somewha
t agree 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
3. I believe that the suspect is _______________? 
 
 Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
Intelligent 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Honest 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Moral 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Upset 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Truthful 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Calculating 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Unstable 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Warm 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Typical 
criminal 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
4. I believe Eva is responsible for the victim’s death. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree 
Somewha
t disagree 
Somewha
t agree 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
5. Eva is guilty. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree 
Somewha
t disagree 
Somewha
t agree 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
6. How confident are you in your assessment of Eva’s guilt? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Very 
unconfiden
t 
Unconfide
nt 
Somewhat 
unconfiden
t 
Somewhat 
confident 
Confident 
Very 
confident 
 
7. In your own words, describe what you believe happened.  
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Appendix C: Demographic questionnaire 
 
1. What is your gender?  Male   Female 
 
2. What is your age?  ___________ 
 
3. What is your school classification?      
 
Freshman     Sophomore     Junior     Senior     Graduate Student 
 
Other (please indicate) ________________ 
 
4. What is your ethnicity? 
 
African American     Asian     Latino/a     Caucasian     Native American 
 
Other (please indicate) ___________________ 
 
5. In which direction do you generally lean in terms of political affiliation? 
 
    Conservative    Democrat    Independent    Liberal    Libertarian   Republican    Not 
political 
 
 Other (please indicate) ___________________ 
 
Do you have any connection to the law enforcement community (i.e., work for DPS, relative 
is an officer, have been arrested)? No         Yes 
 
6. If you answered yes to question 5, please briefly explain the connection. 
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Appendix D: Suspicion check 
 
Please answer the following questions:  
1. Please indicate what you knew about this experiment before participating.  
 
2. In a sentence or two, please indicate what you believe this experiment was about?  
 
3. Do you believe that you were misled in any way during this experiment?      No          
Yes 
 
4. If you believe that you were misled, please describe how. If you do not believe that 
you were misled, then skip this question. 
 
5. Do you believe there was anything strange about this case?  If so, explain.   
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Appendix E: Social influence manipulation 
 
Bogus participant’s statement: Not guilty version given to participants with weak 
expectation. 
I read the evidence over and over again trying to figure out what happened. And I’m not 
convinced that she did it. The evidence against her is not straight forward and I think it is a 
real possibility that this other guy could have been the murderer. Eva’s story just makes sense 
to me. I think it would be a good idea to continue the investigation – find out more about this 
other guy. I have serious doubts – I don’t think she’s guilty. I mean just look at the evidence! 
It doesn’t add up. 
 
Bogus participant’s statement: Guilty version given to participants with strong expectation. 
I read the evidence over and over again trying to figure out what happened. And I’m 
convinced she did it. The evidence against her is pretty straight forward and I don’t think it is 
really possible that this other guy could have been the murderer. Eva’s story just doesn’t 
make sense to me. I think it would be a good idea to arrest her – she is clearly lying about 
this other guy. I have no doubts – I think she’s guilty. I mean just look at the evidence! It all 
adds up.  
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Appendix F: Initial questionnaire 
 
Please answer the following questions: 
 
8. I think that Eva’s account of the event is plausible. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
 
9. During an interview with Eva, I would expect her to lie. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
 
10. I believe that Eva is _______________. Please circle your responses below. 
 
 Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Intelligent 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Honest 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Moral 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Upset 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Truthful 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Calculating 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Unstable 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Warm 1 2 3 4 5 6 
A typical 
criminal 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
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Appendix G: Interview/interrogation techniques by type 
 
Non-accusatory techniques: 
1. Get Eva’s statement and tell her she will be contacted if more information is needed. 
2. Reassure Eva that the investigator is an expert and will handle the case fairly. 
3. Appeal to the importance of cooperation by enlisting Eva’s help in solving the crime. 
4. Refrain from questioning until further evidence is gathered. 
5. Be sympathetic towards Eva’s confusion during the questioning process. 
6. Let Eva know that others are being investigated and the more evidence is being 
gathered. 
7. Inform Eva that she does not need to be afraid, because the evidence of the case will 
eventually be found. 
8. Make it clear that these questions are a procedural formality that has to be followed. 
 
Accusatory techniques: 
1. Pretend to sympathize with Eva’s situation by telling her the crime committed was 
understandable given the situation. 
2. Make Eva believe that the evidence will prove that she is guilty of the crime and that 
lying to investigators won’t help in the long run. 
3. Make Eva believe that it is in her best interest to confess. 
4. Use flattery or praise to make Eva feel good or proud for having committed the crime. 
5. Overwhelm Eva with the amount of evidence against her. 
6. Attempt to trick Eva by presenting false evidence that indicates her guilt. 
7. Repeatedly accuse Eva of having committed the crime. 
8. Make Eva feel guilty about having committed the crime. 
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Appendix H: Interview/interrogation techniques 
 
Below are brief descriptions of different techniques that investigators use during interviews 
and interrogations with suspects in criminal cases.  
 
Imagine that Eva has been brought into a police station for questioning. As investigators in 
this case your goals during this questioning process are to uncover the truth and, if you 
believe the suspect is guilty, to get the suspect to confess. 
 
Please select the FIVE techniques that you believe would help you accomplish your goal(s). 
 
 
Make Eva feel guilty about having committed the crime. 
 
Repeatedly accuse Eva of having committed the crime. 
 
Make it clear that these questions are a procedural formality that has to be followed. 
 
Attempt to trick Eva by presenting false evidence that indicates her guilt. 
 Inform Eva that she does not need to be afraid, because the evidence of the case will 
eventually be found. 
 
Let Eva know that others are being investigated and that more evidence is being gathered. 
 
Overwhelm Eva with the amount of evidence against her. 
 
Use flattery or praise to make Eva feel good or proud for having committed the crime. 
 
Be sympathetic towards Eva’s confusion during the questioning process. 
 
Refrain from questioning until further evidence is gathered. 
 
Make Eva believe that is in her best interest to confess. 
 Appeal to the importance of cooperation by enlisting Eva’s help in solving the crime. 
 
 Make Eva believe that the evidence will prove that she is guilty of the crime and that lying 
to investigators won’t help in the long run. 
 
Reassure Eva that the investigator is an expert and will handle the case fairly. 
 
Get Eva’s statement and tell her she will be contacted if more information is needed. 
 Pretend to sympathize with Eva’s situation by telling her the crime committed was 
understandable given the situation. 
Please double-check that you have selected FIVE techniques! 
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Appendix I: Interview/interrogation questions and statements 
 
Below are several questions and statements that an investigator could make while talking with 
Eva. Remember, as investigators in this case your goals during this questioning process are to 
uncover the truth and, if you believe the suspect is guilty, to get the suspect to confess. 
 
Please select the EIGHT questions or statements that you believe would help you accomplish 
your goal(s). 
 
 Explain to me how you could do something like this. 
 
When the man was attacking you did you notice any distinguishing characteristics, such as 
birthmarks or tattoos? 
 Had you ever previously seen the suspected male? 
 In your opinion did the intruder appear to know his way around the apartment? 
 
Maybe it is possible the victim isn’t quite so innocent after all, but it is hard for me to know 
what to think when you don’t explain why you did it. 
 What were you doing when the man broke into the apartment? 
 
Are you going to start telling the truth about what happened or are you going to continue to 
make this hard on yourself? 
 Why didn’t you call the police after the alleged intruder left? Busy coming up with a story? 
 
Before you open your mouth to lie again, I want you to think carefully about whether you’d 
rather be charged with first-degree murder or manslaughter. 
 How is it that you were able to fight off this man and the victim wasn’t? 
 Do you know any reason why someone would want to hurt the victim? 
 Had you noticed anyone suspicious around the apartment recently? 
 
You know, I’m sure you had good reasons for doing what you did. Why don’t you explain 
them to me and maybe I can help. 
 If the intruder ran out the front door, why was it locked when police showed up? 
 
I realize that you have just gone through a very traumatic situation, but anything you can 
remember would be helpful. 
 We're not here to come down on you...we just want to know what happened. 
 Had the victim been upset the past couple days? 
 Don't lie to me. You insult my intelligence and I don’t like to be insulted. 
 You expect us to believe that you had nothing to do with this? 
 
Did you lock the door to the apartment because you were scared that the man might come 
back? 
 Had you been thinking about killing the victim for awhile or did it just sort of happen? 
 Is anything missing from the apartment that you know of? 
Please double-check that you have selected EIGHT techniques! 
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Appendix J: Interview/interrogation summary 
 
The interview/interrogation with this suspect was videotaped and a transcript was made. We have 
been given access to the transcript with Eva. However, because of time constraints, you will not be 
reading the entire transcript. Instead, you will be reading a brief summary of what occurred during 
Eva’s discussion with the investigator. Please read the summary carefully. 
 
The suspect entered the room quietly and sat down. The investigator began by asking how 
she was feeling. The suspect replied, “I don’t know. Horrible? I still can’t believe this happened.” The 
suspect appeared nervous and tense. She was fidgeting around a great deal. Before asking the suspect 
any further questions, the investigator stated that she needed to focus on answering the question 
otherwise the conversation was going to take much longer. The investigator began by asking general 
questions about the suspect and the suspect’s relationship with the victim, starting with why suspect 
was in the victim’s apartment at the time of the murder. Suspect stared blankly past the investigator 
before responding. She started to speak, but seemed to think better of it and shook her head. “I had 
stopped by to ask her how [husband] was doing. You know, Sarah had been his therapist. He’s 
important to me, and I wanted to make sure everything was ok. She knew who I was, and was happy 
to talk with me.” She nodded when finished with this statement. 
 The investigator asked about her husband’s treatment and the victim’s response when she was 
asked about said treatment. The suspect answered that “She didn’t say much before it happened. She 
needed to finish up something else before we could talk, so I waited in the other room.” Suspect’s 
eyes began watering. The investigator asked her directly, “Did you have any reason to want Sarah 
dead?” The suspect first seemed shocked by the question and then appeared somewhat angry. She 
stated that there was absolutely no reason for her to want the suspect dead and then denied any 
involvement in the murder.  
The suspect was asked a series of questions about how much she cared for her partner. At one 
point she replied, “Of course, I cared. That’s why I went to talk to his therapist.” The investigator 
asked how the suspect thought her partner would respond when he discovered what she had done. The 
suspect shrugged and continued to deny any involvement. She then stated that she was a victim in this 
case as well. She stared at the table and pulled on the sleeves of her shirt.  
The investigator switched to a new topic, wanting to know more specific details about the 
crime scene such as the temperature, objects at the scene (including the murder weapon,) and where 
the suspect was positioned during the murder. The suspect described the situation as best she could, 
but frequently answered that she “didn’t know.” The investigator inquired as to how long the struggle 
took, and when the suspect became involved physically with the struggle. The suspect responded that 
“it all happened so fast, and I was scared. That man was there and I thought he might kill me too.” 
 “There was blood on me and I was hurt, and I didn’t know what to do.” The investigator 
asked how she had been hurt, and she explained that she had been hit in the face during the struggle, 
and she wasn’t able to think straight. She did not know how the murder weapon was taken from the 
male assailant, but suggested that maybe she had knocked it out of his hand. The suspect began to 
shake her head again, and repeated several times “I can’t believe this happened.” Although she 
repeatedly asked if the interview was almost finished and appeared anxious to leave, she also 
appeared to be cooperative.  
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Appendix K: Second questionnaire 
 
1. I believe Eva is  Not guilty Guilty 
 
2. I am confident in my assessment of Eva’s guilt. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
3. I selected techniques with the primary goal of getting the suspect to confess. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
4. It is likely at this point that I would continue investigating the crime in order to look for 
alternative suspects. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
5. Eva was _________ during the interview/ interrogation (i.e., the summary)? 
 Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Defensive 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Honest 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Friendly 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Upset 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Truthful 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Calculating 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Unstable 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Warm 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Confused 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
6. I believe there is enough evidence to arrest Eva for committing this crime. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
7. Based on Eva’s behavior as described in the summary, I think she is telling the truth. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
8. Eva behaved as I expected during the interview/interrogation (i.e., the summary). 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
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9. Eva’s denials were very convincing. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
10. I am confident that Eva is the true culprit in this crime. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
11. The evidence against Eva is very persuasive.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
12. Eva murdered the victim. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
13. I put a lot of thought into the interview/interrogation strategies that I selected. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
14. In your own words, describe what you believe happened.  
 
15. What information did you consider most important in assessing Eva’s guilt or innocence? 
 
16. Which of the following observations were made? Circle your selection below. 
 True Unsure False 
Eva stated that she locked the door because she thought the intruder 
might return. 
True Unsure False 
Eva had been seeing a therapist for emotional problems. True Unsure False 
The crime was committed at lunchtime. True Unsure False 
The victim’s assistant was at the apartment when the murder took 
place. 
True Unsure False 
Eva displayed guilty behavior during the interrogation. True Unsure False 
Eva called the police. True Unsure False 
Eva had a motive for the crime. True Unsure False 
Eva had the victim’s blood on her clothes. True Unsure False 
No one reported seeing a man at the apartment at the time of the 
offense. 
True Unsure False 
Eva was in a state of shock when police arrived at the scene. True Unsure False 
Eva’s fingerprints were found on the knife. True Unsure False 
The victim had received phone calls in which a man threatened her. True Unsure False 
Eva said the intruder who attacked the victim wore gloves. True Unsure False 
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17. If I were on a jury and had to make a decision right now as to whether or not Eva should be 
convicted of the crime, my decision would be to?  
Not convict Eva Convict Eva 
 
 
 
 
 
Only perceivers in the social interaction conditions answered the following questions: 
 
18. Based on the participant’s written statement (or Based on what the other participant said and how 
he or she acted), I think he or she thought the suspect was guilty. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
19. The other participant and I have similar opinions about the case. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
20. The other participant made a convincing argument. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
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